

## THE PAKISTAN CONNECTION

On April 27, Pakistan's border post at Torkham received an unusual VIP. Unlike most other dignitaries, Professor Sebaghulah Mojaddedi was no routine visitor to the historic border post. He was there to set off for an overland journey to Kabul to assume power as the first ruler of the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Most of his fellow travellers in the convoy of Mercedes limousines and Land Cruisers had, in the past, been quietly slipping through this border into Afghanistan during their 14 years of struggle against communist rule. But this time round, they were returning for good and were accorded an official farewell, with a smartly-dressed unit of border militia presenting them with a guard of honour.

There was also a measure of poetic justice about the send off. All the top government leaders from Pakistan, the country which had long played host to the Afghan leaders in exile, were conspicuous by their absence. Their place was filled in by none other than Lt.

administration broke into an uninhabited victory chant. Prominent among them was Pakistan's top spymaster who understandably joined in the exuberant chanting. If this was a victory for the Afghan mujahideen, the new 'Made in Pakistan' government was no less an achievement for his agency.

Professor Mojaddedi and his comrades-in-arms could not have chosen a more auspicious day to embark on their journey. April 27 marked the completion of 14 years of the Saur Revolution, which had brought the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to power. The turbulent intervening years had changed the face of Afghanistan. The PDPA's promise of turning Afghanistan into a progressive and modern state remained a dream, as the bloody civil war destroyed whatever there was in this backward, landlocked country.

If doubts were left in anyone's mind about the 'direct involvement of the Pakistani establishment in the entire affair, they were

also conspicuously present was the chief of the Saudi intelligence and security, Prince Turki Al-Faisal.

"It is the success of our foreign policy," premier Nawaz Sharif said as the new mujahideen government of Professor Mojaddedi took over power in Kabul. But with little sign of any patch-up between Hekmatyar and the new Kabul administration headed by Mojaddedi, most Afghan-watchers described the claim of success as a little premature. On the contrary, the post-Najib turmoil in Afghanistan and the infighting among the mujahideen was being mostly blamed on Pakistan. "Despite being so deeply involved in the conflict for 14 years, the Pakistani establishment was found napping when the real action began," is the conclusion of a strategic studies expert in Peshawar.

Despite eventually succeeding in forcing most of the mujahideen groups to unite on the highly-complicated formula of power transfer, a huge question mark hovered over the stability of the new dispensation. The kind of differences that

worse. The main questions being asked, not surprisingly, had less to do with the future policies of the new Islamic government than with how long it was going to last.

A number of other questions are also currently plaguing observers of the Afghan scene. Despite the transfer of power in Kabul, does the present scenario bear any semblance to what was envisaged by the United Nations-led peace initiative? Who is really to blame for the current ominous bouts of infighting? With a patchwork of different mujahideen groups forming a coalition government with little or no central authority, and faced with growing ethnic tension, can Afghanistan hold to the arrangement that has been worked out?

The Pakistani establishment may have remained in the forefront of the Afghan jihad, but its claim of having a finger on the pulse of events there was proven false. In fact, it was completely taken by surprise by the newly emerging situation. The rapidly changing situation had indicated that Najib's days were numbered, but the Pakistani Foreign Office as well as the top agencies were completely unaware of ongoing developments. The result was that when the crunch actually came, they were caught napping.

Soon, a series of meetings started to take place in Peshawar and Islamabad among the mujahideen leaders themselves, as well as between Pakistani officials and the mujahideen leadership. The single aim was to evolve a joint strategy. And it was during these parleys that the real differences among the mujahideen groups, as well as the Pakistani government's inability to make their protégés come to an agreement, came to the surface. Although Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif officially led the Pakistani side in the talks with the mujahideen leadership, the entire operation was in fact being controlled by the top brass of the ISI. Whether it was the first round of the Nawaz Sharif-mujahideen talks in Islamabad, the subsequent rounds of day and night talks



The Nation

4/29

General Javed Nasir, chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – the Pakistani agency which had masterminded the not-so-covert operation in Afghanistan for almost fourteen years.

The air was filled by cries of "Allah-o-Akbar," several hundred jubilant Afghans who had gathered to see off Professor Mojaddedi and other members of his interim

removed by Premier Nawaz Sharif's lightning trip to Kabul on April 29. Perhaps to underscore the establishment's unanimity on the issue of the new government, the prime minister thought it necessary to take along the army chief, General Asif Nawaz, and ISI chief Lt. General Javed Nasir, as well as several members of Islamabad's ruling coalition.

cropped up soon after its announcement, and the way the mujahideen used their coveted rockets and machine guns against each other, was ample proof that the new arrangement was more fragile than previously anticipated.

The compromise choice of Professor Mojaddedi as the new leader, a man who hardly has any active force at his disposal let alone control of any area, made matters even

in Peshawar or behind the scenes activity, it was virtually an ISI show. "After having spent a full 14 years destabilising the communist regime in Afghanistan, this was their big chance to cash in on the situation. One would be naive to expect that these people would now simply leave it to the fractious mujahideen leadership to decide on the future government of Afghanistan," remarked a high level government official.

The first round of talks – the initial session of which was held at the prime minister's house, and the next in the mess of the ISI headquarters – proved to be disastrous. After spending two whole days trying to convince the Afghan leaders, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif left the capital in disgust and went to Lahore to spend his weekend there as usual. He was reportedly so disturbed by their infighting, that he is said to have advised the mujahideen leaders to seize the opportunity that had come their way, take a plane to Kabul and assume power.

Highly reliable sources in the government maintain that the prime minister was so annoyed that he simply refused to delay his private sojourn to Geneva, and an official visit to Austria, only agreeing to curtail it by two days.

Nawaz Sharif may have given up hope of hammering out a consensus, but the highest agency in the country did not. This time round, it decided to bring in the most important leaders of the most religious-political parties on the scene, and tried to use their influence in working out a solution. The Jamaat-e-Islami's Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the leaders of the two factions of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Senator Samiul Haq, were asked to use their influence with various mujahideen groups in order to help end the conflict. All these efforts, however, met with little or no success.

In all this time, the person who really cut a sorry figure was the official spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office, who by then had been asked to hold daily briefings for reporters on the situation in

Afghanistan. On three separate occasions, the spokesman declared that an agreement had been reached between all warring factions, and even gave the details of the rapprochement. However, each time he was proved wrong – within hours of his announcement, statements would pour in from different quarters about the sharp differences between the various factions.

By the time Nawaz Sharif returned to Pakistan, the situation had changed yet again. The field commanders, who are really in charge of operations, had once again convinced the leaders to make one last sortie. The commanders also believed that any delay on the part of the Peshawar-based leaders would compel them to resort to direct action. Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud announced the formation of a Jihad Council to inhibit direct action, and in order to counter him in the field, Gulbadin Hekmatyar left Peshawar and went to the front to lead his forces. The message was clear, and left the mujahideen leadership and their patrons with no choice but to form a mujahideen council. The pressure from the field also made the UN peace proposal of a 15-member pre-transition council of neutral Afghans totally irrelevant. Even Pakistan was now forced to declare that it supports the interim council comprising representatives of the mujahideen alone.

By April 18, the authorities in Pakistan had convinced most of the groups to accept a formula for the transfer of power. But as differences still lingered, the last round of meetings was held on April 24. While the leaders were in consultation over the issue, an announcement was made by the mujahideen that they would be addressing a news conference sometime between four and nine pm. The reason provided was that this was meant to be the last round of consultations before a consensus would be announced.

Since differences still remained, with Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami and the Iranian-based Shia group, the Hezb-i-Wahdat, still opposing the formula, the mujahideen were

asked by the authorities to consider a majority vote as well. Perhaps the idea of not insisting upon a consensus was taken from President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's remarks. During his meeting with the visiting chief of United States control command, General Hoar, the president had said that if arriving at a consensus was difficult, the mujahideen could also consider the majority vote option.

It was with this option in mind that Pakistan's top brass once again gathered at the Governor House in Peshawar on April 24. Other than the prime minister and his aides from the foreign ministry, those present included the army chief, General Asif Nawaz, ISI chief Lt. General Javed Nasir, and several other army officers. Senior officials from Iran and Saudi Arabia were also present on the occasion. It was made clear to the mujahideen that this was their last chance to agree upon a formula for a transfer of power.

Meanwhile, Gulbadin Hekmatyar remained aloof from the proceedings. The Iranian-based group, for its part, was unable to keep up with the fast pace of developments, and even the Iranian envoy was unable to do anything in this regard. The result was a majority decision on a formula according to which the transfer of power was to take place in three phases. A fifty-member council was formed, comprising 30 field commanders, and some mujahideen leaders and ulema. The council was to be headed by Professor Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, who

was given the mandate to run the administration in Kabul for two months, during which time he was to oversee the transfer of power to a mujahideen government.

The mujahideen government was to come in the second phase, in which the president would be chosen from Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-e-Islami, the prime minister from Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, and Ahmed Shah Massoud was to be the defence minister. Other mujahideen leaders, meanwhile, would get a share of the cake in the form of some ministerial posts.

In the third phase, the mujahideen government was to ensure the holding of free and fair elections in the country and to hand over power to the elected representatives of the people.

The formula was both complex and flawed, but both the mujahideen leadership and the Pakistani establishment were apparently left with no other choice but to give it a chance. Hekmatyar saw in this deal a conspiracy to reduce his powers, as the Hezb-i-Islami considers itself to be the biggest and most powerful mujahideen group.

Not only did Hekmatyar reject the Peshawar formula, he also decided to take Kabul by storm. "Perhaps he became a victim of his own delusions of grandeur, and thought that he would capture Kabul easily," says a mujahideen leader from a rival group. This was perhaps the single biggest blunder made by the hardline leader, and it cost him dearly.

He made some initial progress by getting into an

Afghan solution 'within our grasp'



alliance with the Pashtun section of the Afghan army and managed to capture some strategic locations. But what he failed to realise was that in all this time, his rivals had made both political and military gains at his expense. As soon as Hekmatyar attacked Kabul, Professor Mojaddedi used the opportunity to declare himself the leader of the proposed political arrangement with Ahmed Shah Massoud as the new defence minister. He also legitimised his decision to join hands with the Afghan army.

Hekmatyar's actions annoyed the Pakistani government because it thwarted their attempts to bring about negotiated peace and a consensus political government. After having patronised Hekmatyar for all these years, the government finally recognised Ahmed Shah Massoud as a legitimate contender for power.

It was with direct pressure from Saudi Arabia, and after Hekmatyar had been severely defeated, that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went to Peshawar again and spoke to both Massoud and Hekmatyar over the wireless. By insisting upon a ceasefire, he had hoped to achieve a face-saving formula for Hekmatyar. But by that time, Mojaddedi and his fellow council members had already embarked upon their journey to Kabul, and had taken charge the very next day. Nawaz Sharif did not lose this opportunity and flew into Kabul the day after, along with his cabinet colleagues and the army and intelligence chiefs. The decision to fly to Kabul seemed to fully endorse what they had been established as the 'Made in Pakistan' government of Afghanistan.


Meanwhile, the triumphant Peshawar-based mujahideen declared that they had "recaptured" Afghanistan. But in effect, the situation on the ground offered a bizarre patchwork of contending forces in charge – a situation even more fragmented than in the past.

All the provinces have a different composition of government and varied mujahideen groups control each area. In some places, a local shura of mujahideen commanders, ulema and tribal

elders with no previous claim to power now hold sway. In Kabul itself, the so-called united government is far from united. The worst aspect is that except for Pakistan, the new Kabul government is left with no ally, whereas during the Soviet occupation it had no end of supporters rallying to the cause of self-determination.

It is difficult to say what the new Afghanistan will be like or how many countries will come to aid in its reconstruction. It all depends on how long Mojaddedi can hold out before a new round of clashes, conspiracies and coups plunge the country into anarchy. ■

From Zaffar Abbas in Islamabad



MASOUD

The Afghan groups were never divided over the way in which they envisioned a future Afghanistan. They were primarily divided either on the basis of ethnicity or because of individual ambitions and clash of personalities. The years of warfare only served to harden such differences between Pashtuns and the Persian-speaking population and between the hardliners and the moderates because of the support some of them were able to muster from competing interests outside the country. The fact that the Central Asian republics, Iran, and Pakistan, have had their own interests and perceptions to serve in favouring different groups and alignments makes it unlikely they would now act impartially to help resolve the conflict in that country.

Islamabad does not yet realise that it is well and truly in a no-win situation.

By Aziz Siddiqui

Two blunders sealed the fate of former Afghan strongman Dr Najibullah...

Afghan mujahideen leaders, particularly Hekmatyar, had declared in January 1989 that the moment the last Soviet left Afghanistan, it would be a matter of weeks before the rebels defeated the PDPA regime and fulfilled their cherished dream of offering prayers in Kabul. The Soviets left within weeks of that statement, but it took the mujahideen another three years – which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union – to oust the Najibullah administration.

During this period, it had become abundantly clear that no single group could gain outright victory in Afghanistan. If the PDPA (later dubbed the Watan Party) was unable to eliminate the mujahideen and establish its control over the whole of Afghanistan, then the collective forces of the mujahideen too were not capable of ousting Najibullah's government.

As the civil war continued to eat into the very fabric of the country, virtually destroying it both economically and socially, the international community finally began to see that a middle path would have to be worked out to break the stalemate. In May last year, the UN secretary general unfurled a peace plan for the war-torn country. Benon Sevan, his specially appointed peacemaker for Afghanistan, was given the task of implementing the new plan.



The UN-appointed peacemaker spent numerous sleepless nights, and his shuttle diplomacy in the region took him on countless trips to Islamabad, Kabul and Tehran. At one stage, Sevan came close to making all the groups agree on the composition of his proposed 15-member pre-transition council. But ironically, events began to move faster than this painstaking process and, eventually, the situation on the ground completely overtook the peace efforts. Sevan was soon sidelined by nearly every mujahideen group, and was perhaps the main loser in the entire endgame.

The speed with which changes occurred in Afghanistan resulted in the sudden collapse of the entire administration, the removal of Najibullah, the fall of one city after another, the ominous battle between Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud and, finally, the establishment of the Mojaddedi-led mujahideen government. These rapid developments left most Afghan observers absolutely stunned. But according to many students of Afghan politics, this was how it was most likely to happen.

"In the tightrope-walking that Najibullah had been doing throughout this period – confronting the well-armed mujahideen on the one hand and trying to appease different ethnic and political sections of his establishment on the other – just one major mistake was needed to trigger off such events," says one analyst of Afghan affairs. And for his part, Najib made not just one, but two major blunders which proved to be his final undoing.

The first was his move to annoy the powerful Uzbek militia headed by General Rasheed Dostum, which turned the

gained had an even bigger enemy than the mujahideen. In a fit of premature panic, Najibullah decided to induct certain hardline Pashtuns into key posts, which drastically curtailed the powers of General Dostum. It is said that Dostum tried to convince Najibullah that it was his militia which had won Kabul all the major battles and that he (Dostum) should not be treated in such a cavalier manner. But when Najib refused to budge, Dostum changed his loyalties, leading to the fall of the most important of all the cities, Mazar-e-Sharif, to the joint command of his men and the local mujahideen.

Najib's second, and perhaps biggest, blunder was the premature announcement that he was willing to step down to help expedite the peace process. Despite being a shrewd politician, Najibullah failed to realise that this decision would ultimately prove disastrous for the UN-initiated peace effort. "In Afghanistan, people rarely side with the weak, and its history is full of events where people have switched loyalties the moment they thought the ruler was becoming weak," says an observer of Afghan affairs. And this is precisely what happened. The moment Najibullah made this announcement, a flurry of defections started in the ranks. Within a couple of weeks, Najibullah was reduced to a nobody.

Some of his most trusted comrades and generals, from Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil to General Nabi Azimi, deserted him to join hands with General Rasheed Dostum during the takeover of Kabul. And when his most trusted man, General Yaqoobi, committed suicide (or was murdered), the game was over for Najibullah. The message was clear: in the cut-throat and treacherous arena of Afghan politics, Najibullah had been defeated not by the mujahideen, but by his own men.

Najibullah then made an attempt to flee the country, only to find that his new enemies, led by General Dostum, had taken over control of Kabul airport. He was not only refused permission to leave, but the one-time powerful president of Afghanistan was forced to seek refuge in the United Nations office in Kabul. That is where he still remains, his fate hanging in the balance.

A seasoned journalist who was in Kabul during these events says that it was not really Najibullah who made the decision to step down. Rather, it was the United Nations envoy, Benon Sevan, who forced him to announce this decision which, in turn, led to a chain of dramatic events. Whether the final decision was made by Najibullah himself or by Benon Sevan, in the end both emerged as the losers in the game. . . .

# Staying On

Supporters of the hated communist regime keep a low profile, as a cloud of deep uncertainty hangs over their fate...

**W**atan Party officials have locked themselves into their houses, fearing the worst. No men seem to have fled, although many of them have already sent their wives and children to India or Central Asia. "I owe it to myself to stay till the end of the film," said a senior Watan member and a close aide to former President Najibullah. "When I decided to stay, I accepted my death sentence. I think I will not regret it," he added.

Others less well connected have evacuated their families to their villages in the hope that tribal and clan ties will protect them from retribution. There are some 50,000 Watan Party members in the army, the bureaucracy and the government – 30,000 of whom live in Kabul – many of them women. But the majority are Pashtuns, who are honour-bound to stay on in Kabul. General Gulham Farooq Yabubi, head of the once feared WAD Afghan secret service, chose to commit suicide rather than face the wrath of the mujahideen.

The international community and the UN have put intense pressure on the mujahideen not to seek retribution from Watan members. Although Massoud and some commanders have declared a general amnesty, pressure from the soldiers who lost family and friends in the war will undoubtedly result in trials of the worst human rights offenders in the party.

The key to the issue of retribution is the fate of Najibullah. If he is let off and allowed to leave the country, there is a strong possibility there will be no treason trials. But, as one senior Watan official said, "If Najib is executed then there will be a wave of killings and the Watan officials will be decimated. If one man goes, then others will follow."

The Watan Party itself is deeply split along ethnic lines. The Tajiks and Uzbeks, who were already in touch with Massoud and other commanders, may escape official retaliation. And many hardline Pashtuns belonging to the Khalq faction were also closely in touch with Gulbadin Hekmatyar, and helped him in the final weeks. However, there is no accepted leader amongst them who has the prestige to rally the party. It will quickly disintegrate, with those members who are spared joining their ethnic brothers amongst the mujahideen.

For the time being, it appears that senior army and air force officers may be spared. The mujahideen will need professional soldiers to integrate their guerrillas into the army and manage technical hardware. Also, the majority of senior generals closely cooperated with Massoud to make the takeover of Kabul as peaceful as possible. ■

— A. Rashid



As the price of chadars escalates in the face of unprecedented demand, the women of Kabul brace themselves for new restrictions on their freedom...

Ismat Wardak, the former Minister of Education and one of the leading defenders of women's rights, still wore her skirt but wrapped a big scarf around her head when she attended the inauguration ceremony of President Mojaddedi. "I do not know what the future holds for women. It worries me more than anything else at the moment," she told the *Herald*.

The tens of thousands of rural women who will be returning from the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan – especially those who have been born abroad and have never seen their homeland – do not possess the basic skills they would need for survival back home. Shepherding flocks of animals, working the land, cutting wood and providing enough food for the

family are among the jobs that many refugee women are unaccustomed to. Under the control of hardline mujahideen, these women's lives were severely regimented. They were not allowed to study, girls schools teaching non-Quranic subjects were closed down and women were not allowed to work outside the refugee camps. These rural women are now also asking searching questions about their future.

From Ahmed Rashid in Kabul



Despite the unsettled conditions back home and a route strewn with landmines, an overwhelming majority of Afghan refugees is eager to go home, although a small affluent minority would prefer to keep its options open...

**E**ight-year-old Abdul Hadi's response was prompt: he will go back to his homeland, given a choice. Hadi was born five years after his parents came to Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Clad in a dirty shalwar-kameez, Hadi shyly admits that he has never seen what he believes is "his" country. "But it is my homeland, and I will go back to it," he says in a determined voice standing in front of his father's small grocery shop in Katchi Garhi, a village眼泪 near Peshawar.

Almost all the Afghan refugees who live in camps or in houses in the city and run their own small businesses or deal in money exchange at Chowk Yadgar, respond in a similar manner. "Jond zurroon ho," (going back is imperative), says Mullah Jan Sarbaz, a resident of Sarkhad, near Jalalabad. Originally a farmer, he now runs a small shop and has been in this country for the last 14 years. Sarbaz came to Pakistan as a newly-wed; he now has seven children. He made his decision to move to Pakistan when his house was burnt down by Soviet troops. "Those who are not willing to go back are not Afghans," he says emphatically. "I have little desire to stay in Pakistan," he adds, though he appreciates the hospitality extended to him by the government and the people of Pakistan.

A greying, bearded man, 65-year-old Abdul Basim, says definitively that "everyone is ready to go back." Basim plies a rickshaw in Peshawar. He laughs contemptuously at the suggestion that the Afghans will never go back.

Mohammed Ismail, a middle-aged Kandahari, interrupts him to reiterate: "We are leaving."

Only one young man, Amanullah, seemed a little circumspect. "As soon as conditions at home improve, we will go back," he says. The elderly people sitting nearby intervene saying, "We believe that the Hazb and Jamiat will unite, and peace will be restored, paving the way for our return."

Over the years, the tents supplied by relief agencies for emergency accommodation have given way to mud houses. Their camps, still called "tentile villages," may actually be more comfortable and better equipped than some of the katchi abadis found in the larger cities of Pakistan. Sceptics who argue that the refugees will not return point to this fact in support of their claim. They point to the living conditions of most Afghans in Pakistan which they claim are far superior to those available in their home country.

While the bulk of those living in the camps insist they will return to Afghanistan, it seems likely that the more affluent Afghans with established businesses and trade concerns in Pakistan are not likely to abandon these, unless it is done under duress. Many of the more affluent, in fact, privately concede that they would like to maintain some kind of presence in this country even if they formally return to their homes. Nonetheless, since the overwhelming majority of the refugees live in camps and is poor, it might be to their benefit to return home to their pre-migration professions or their few acres of land.

The vast majority of the Afghan refugees live in camps in the Frontier and in Balochistan. Most of them have migrated from different provinces of Afghanistan, the heaviest influx being from Paktia, closely followed by Nangarhar.

The trickle of returning refugees has, over the weeks, slowly begun to swell into a stream. At Torkham, the border village between Afghanistan and Pakistan, caravans of refugees are sighted returning to other destinations in Afghanistan. They have been arriving from different parts of the Frontier province. Since the refugees can encash their ration cards for 3,000 rupees and 300 kilograms of wheat at the checkpoint, they all want to cross from the official border line, irrespective of their place of residence in Afghanistan.

According to UNHCR officials, during the last one year, 56,230 families have returned to Afghanistan. Incidentally, the highest number of refugees, 30,441, has made the exodus from Balochistan. The prospect of peace in their country is obviously going to speed up the process.

The number is likely to increase soon for another reason, says Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Khalil, head of the Peshawar chapter of an Islamic relief agency that runs clinics, hospitals, orphanages and schools in these camps. "They would like to go back before the setting in of the hot season," he says and believes that these people will not wait for a formal call. He says that even now, there are houses left vacant by homeward bound refugees in these camps. According to him, people are beginning to leave in droves. But he also believes that peace is vital to the majority's return, since the routes to many other provinces pass through Kabul.

Afghan relief agencies have not encouraged the return of the refugees for their own political reasons. That, according to Dr Khalil, is the main reason for the highest number of refugees leaving for home from Balochistan, where these agencies do not have as much influence.

Peace is not the only prerequisite to ensure a safe passage home for the refugees, however. One major obstacle is the fact that millions of landmines have been laid all along the way by the Kabul and Soviet forces. "In fact, the entire country is infested with mines," states Dr Azmatullah, an Afghan working with a relief agency in Pakistan.

The doctor has been making regular visits to the war-torn country to carry the wounded to the agency's hospital. "Only yesterday," he told the Herald on April 27, "on our way to Jalalabad and back to Peshawar, we saw at least two vehicles destroyed by the mines." These mines have to be removed before the mass exodus begins, he says.

Anybody making his way

back is warned to drive or walk in the middle of the road. Any violation is considered dangerous. Most of the bridges have also been destroyed and the people have to follow makeshift diversion mud tracks that are equally dangerous. The United Nations has taken up a comprehensive programme to remove the mines but has not made much progress so far.

It has not been smooth in the camps, contrary to what many people here believe. Forced migration has caused complicated psychological problems among a large number of refugees. "As many as 70 per cent of the refugee population suffers from various degrees and kinds of depression, though all of them do not come to the clinics for various reasons," says Dr Mohammad Tahir Jan, incharge of the psychiatric clinic run in the camp by a relief agency.

His assessment is based on the diagnosis of about 150 patients of all ages who come to his clinic each day. "There are various reasons for psychological disorders," he says, "the main one being the death of friends and family. Each family has lost at least one member – a father, a son, a brother or some other close relative.

"Then there are socio-economic problems as well. A refugee who had been a teacher or engaged in a similarly respectable profession at home suddenly finds himself sitting at a vegetable shop completely at a loss," says Dr Tahir Jan.

Dr Jan feels that a prolonged stay in the camps is yet another cause for distress. These camps do not have many of the civic amenities and life has been hard for those used to better standards of living. There are also several young men who carry the psychological scars of having been forcibly enlisted in the army.

Women are more prone to psychological disorders than men. There are several widows who have children to look after and feed. They do not have any supporting male hand and have to depend for their subsistence on the allowances given by the international relief agencies and the government of Pakistan. Unmarried young

girls suffer from anxiety caused by the uncertainty of their futures. Married women suffer because their husbands have been away fighting for long spells of time, sometimes for six months at a stretch. "The absence and imminent deaths of their spouses have made chronic women out of them," says Dr Jan.

Generally, the long-harboured dream of returning home is the common cause of psychological problems. "Since the day that these people have had to leave their homes, they have been hoping to go back," says Dr Jan. The long delay of over 13 years has resulted in deep despair and hopelessness seeping into their psyche. "Once they go back and settle down," the doctor says, "their condition will improve."

But that improvement is subject to the general improvement in the affairs of their country. Any hope of an early return can only depend on how quickly peace returns to Afghanistan. "If that is ensured, there will be a mass exodus from here," says Dr Khalil. ■

From Idrees Bakhtiar  
in Peshawar

#### Tribal Afghanistan

**SIR**—In discussing the problems of Afghanistan (May 2nd), your correspondent correctly stresses the tribal basis of Afghan society and the key point that there is no tradition or wish for a strong central government.

History shows that disaster has always followed foreign interference in Afghanistan. The rural Afghan, who forms the majority of the population, has no wish for either communism or democracy. He has a well-tried social system based on the family and the tribe, which guarantees the personal liberty that he values so highly. Before the communist regime, no Kabul government had attempted to disturb this stability by imposing its authority.

Efforts by the United Nations or the United States to impose a democratic system, or by neighbouring countries to establish an authoritarian Muslim state, would cause tribal strife and ethnic division. Let the world offer aid to restore the traditional society, and not political advice that will destroy it, with the same generosity as arms have been given in the past.

Guliford

PETER STILES

THE ECONOMIST MAY 30TH

# Pan-Islamic Movements Collide With Secular Policies in Broad Region of Asia

By MARK FINEMAN  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

**C**OXA BAZAR, Bangladesh—The young hotel owner softened his voice as he related the latest rumor in the villages of southeastern Bangladesh: *Mujahideen* rebels from Afghanistan had slipped into a local compound owned by a Saudi Arabian relief group, where they trained fundamentalist Bangladeshi and Burmese Muslims in the use of machine guns.

Hundreds of miles to the north, in the war-torn Himalayan city of Srinagar, such rumors have become fact: Kashmiri rebels who once fought alongside the Afghan *mujahideen* in their struggle against Soviet Communist invaders now are waging a "holy war" for secession from India, in part with the backing of Muslim fundamentalist forces in neighboring Pakistan.

And in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, which has emerged as both the barometer and vanguard for South Asia's hundreds of millions of Muslims, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is battling with the nation's small but well-organized fundamentalist clergy—a pan-Islamic lobbying group that seeks to form an "Islamic belt" stretching from North Africa eastward to Myanmar and including the strategic, newly independent republics of former Soviet Central Asia.

Such is the view here in one of Asia's most populous Muslim nations at a time when global analysts in East and West are speculating with increasing concern about the post-Cold War world. Many of those analysts fear that divisions between Islam and the West will ultimately replace the now-ended struggle between capitalism and communism.

These images of change, gathered during several weeks of traveling through this part of the Muslim world, appear on the surface to confirm what one prominent South Asian analyst called "the Western world's worst nightmare—the Muslims all getting together."

"There is, in fact, a strong pan-Islamic feeling all over South Asia," said Mushahid Hussein, a Pakistani political commentator in Islamabad who has traveled throughout the Islamic world since he graduated from Georgetown University. "If anyone in Algeria sneezes, someone in Islamabad catches a cold."

Indeed, for nearly a decade, Pakistan was the logistic and ideological conduit for the CIA's proxy war with the Kremlin in Afghanistan, in which the Islamabad gov-

ernment funneled billions of dollars in arms and cash to the anti-Soviet *mujahideen*, the Muslim guerrillas of Afghanistan. Throughout the Afghan civil war, which still rages even though Moscow withdrew its occupation troops in February, 1989, Pakistan favored the most fundamentalist of the Afghan rebel groups. Its goal: to establish an Islamic regime in its western neighbor, forming a regional belt of Islam stretching from Iran to Pakistan.

What is more, U.S. and Indian intelligence sources say the Pakistanis have diverted some of the arms meant for the *mujahideen* to the more fundamentalist groups waging a war of independence in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state where such support is transforming what began as a Kashmir nationalist rebellion into a *jihad*, or holy war.

Similarly, there are abundant rumors of Saudi-backed Pakistani involvement as far afield as the remote Bangladeshi cities of Chittagong and Cox's Bazar. It is there that moderate Muslims such as the hotel owner speak darkly of the region's youth being converted to a more militant form of Islam.

There is even a growing movement among the youth in southern Bangladesh to support and intensify an armed struggle to create a separate Islamic nation in the bordering Myanmar state of Arakan, where a brutal crackdown by the predominantly Buddhist military has driven tens of thousands of starving and angry Muslim refugees into Bangladeshi border camps.

The deepest concern lies to the northwest of Pakistan, in the newly emerged Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. All four have large Muslim majorities, and in the months since the collapse of the Soviet Union, their Islamic clergy have launched a sweeping campaign to reassert the region's Muslim identity after 70 years of often-bloody Communist repression.

Secular regimes have managed to endure in all four states, where some advocates of democracy now say they fear the forces of Islam as much as they do the remnants of communism. In fact, one such pro-democracy leader in Turkmenistan's capital, Ashkhabad, just 20 miles from the Iranian border, said soon after his republic declared independence last year that the worst threat came not from Moscow but from Islamabād.

And it was those shared fears that brought U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III to the

Central Asian republics last month. "We think that Islam will never gain political power in Turkmenistan, for example, and there will never be very close relations with Iran," said Turkmenistan's pro-democracy leader, Turdymurat Khodja Mukhammedov, "but it is Pakistan that we fear will try to introduce more Islam in all of Central Asia. And the reason why I am afraid of Pakistan's influence is because they haven't had any taste of democracy—real democracy."

But there are emerging signs that Pakistan is radically rethinking its role in a future Islamic belt. Motivated largely by those fears in Central Asia, Pakistan's Prime Minister Sharif has quietly embarked in recent weeks on a bold campaign to change his nation's fundamentalist, pan-Islamic image.

In its most striking recent policy shift, Pakistan announced Jan. 25 that it was supporting U.S. efforts to create a broad-based, secular interim government in Afghanistan, a move that virtually abandoned the fundamentalist *mujahideen* groups still favoring a military solution that would install an Islamic regime in Kabul. Already, Islamabad has cut all arms supplies to the rebels.

Sharif's point man in his country's new assertion of moderation conceded recently that the campaign already has incurred the wrath of Pakistan's fundamentalists. But he said it is vital for Pakistan to quickly change its regional image, lest it make more new enemies than friends.

For Sardar Aseef Ahmed Ali, Sharif's minister of state for economic affairs and chief advocate of the new moderation drive, there is "little attraction for Pakistan to serve as the vortex of an Islamic belt that might some day be powerful enough to challenge the West. In the emerging new world order, with its rapidly shifting global markets, he said, economics is more important than theology."

Sardar Aseef bases his view on a three-week state tour of all four Central Asian republics as Sharif's personal emissary last December. The greatest fear Sardar Aseef said he encountered during his tour was the same as that of Ashkhabad's Turdymurat—that Pakistan would keep supporting the Afghan rebels until an Islamic government takes power there, forcing a tidal wave of more moderate Afghan refugees into the border states of Central Asia, and ultimately that Pakistan would attempt to export its own brand of fundamentalism to the newly independent republics themselves.

In projecting arguments that contributed heavily to Pakistan's recent policy shift on Afghanistan, Sardar Aseef said he told Sharif and the nation's powerful military leaders, "These are the fears of Central Asia, and if we make mistakes now, instead of having five potential allies and economic partners, we're going to get five potential enemies."

A senior Western diplomat in Islamabad agreed that geography has defined Pakistan's new regional imperatives. To reach the new markets of Central Asia, all of which are desperate for the goods that Pakistan needs to sell, Islamabad must have land routes through an Afghanistan free from war.

Sardar Aseef acknowledges that Sharif's shift in Afghan policy has angered Pakistan's own vocal fundamentalists.

## Muslim Nations in Ferment



damentalists, but he says they are a fanatic fringe whose influence has long been overrated in his country, which was created as a refuge for the subcontinent's Muslim minority when Britain granted independence to both India and the new nation of Pakistan in 1947.

Stressing that Pakistan's fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami party holds just 10 seats in the National Assembly, he added: "Ninety percent of this country are moderates. They're not fanatics . . . It's a total myth. I don't think anyone has called their bluff yet."

And rather than auguring a Pakistan with a vital role in an Islamic region, Sardar Aseff said, the fundamentalists are instead the last gasp of a medieval movement.

"I believe this side of pan-Islam is a dead duck in Pakistan," he said. "No sensible person is for this. . . . I think the vast majority of the country are fed up with these people."

But Sardar Aseff conceded that "there remains a very strong pan-Islamic feeling in Pakistan." And other analysts such as Muhsin Jusseem suggested that Pakistan's progressive new economic approach to the new Central Asian republics, as well as to its old Muslim neighbors such as Bangladesh, ultimately will be the vehicle to a more fundamental pan-Islam.

In describing the evolution of Pakistan's policy toward newly liberated Central Asia, for example, Hussein placed it in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was for decades the closest ally of Pakistan's traditional enemy, predominantly Hindu India.

Hussein, who labels himself not a fundamentalist but "an Islamic nationalist," agreed that Pakistan must distance itself from the image of its western neighbor, Iran, which ranks as one of Pakistan's most formidable regional competitors for the moderate new Muslim markets of Central Asia. But he insisted that his nation will never lose sight of its basic Islamic moorings.

"The only difference between Iran and Pakistan, is that Iran has a clerical regime," he said. "But Islam is what makes Pakistan click, and that's the basis of the whole future relationship, whether in Central Asia or in the region as a whole."

Still, moderates such as Sardar Aseff concluded that the future of the Asian fringe of Islam depends in large part on how the West reacts to winds of change now blowing here.

When asked about Western perceptions of the emerging new Islamic belt, Sardar Aseff said: "So does Europe look like a Christian belt to us. These are, I think, very, very stupid fears."

LOS ANGELES TIMES

MARCH 7, 1992

## ■ Thousands of Muslims learned guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Where will they go next?

By MARK FINEMAN  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

**P**ESHAWAR, Pakistan—The House of the Holy Warriors is an unassuming, two-story bungalow on School Road, distinguishable only by the machine-gun nest at the front gate.

There is no sign outside, no address, and few inside who are willing to talk to strangers about the thousands of heavily armed Muslim fighters from throughout the world who have used this and other safehouses as staging grounds in their devastating war with communism for the soul of Afghanistan.

Especially not now.

For now, as the war they helped wage for more than a decade winds down, secular regimes in more than a dozen nations from Algeria to China are increasingly concerned that the international warriors who have passed through these safehouses and fought alongside the Afghan *mujahedeen* (holy warriors) may represent their worst nightmare: a dedicated and devout army of fundamentalist Muslim revolutionaries, trained in the art of guerrilla war and prepared to move on to the next jihad—the next holy war.

Few could explain the phenomenon that has ignited such widespread debate throughout the Muslim belt of Africa and Asia in recent weeks as starkly as Abou Abd Allah El-Miliani, one of the few Arab fighters willing to meet a Times reporter at the House of the Holy Warriors last week.

"I have come here for jihad," the young Arab warrior said in broken English. "I have fought for one year in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is still good for jihad. Maybe I will fight for one year more. But then, *inshallah*, I will go back home and make jihad there. By then, it will be good for jihad at home."

Home, Miliani explained, is Algeria, the secular North African nation now facing a bitter Islamic uprising after authorities blocked the Muslims from winning elections earlier this year. Miliani apologized for the absence of his translator, a Filipino who, he explained, similarly answered the call to jihad in Afghanistan. The translator will soon return to fight alongside the Islamic Mora National Liberation Front guerrilla army that has been trying to take power in the Philippine island of Mindanao, Miliani said.

As the Algerian spoke, armed militants from Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia and other nations struggling to put down burgeoning Muslim fundamentalist forces at home wandered in and out of the front gate, also biding their time until the next battle in what they depict as a holy war for Islam.

"There's no question it's going to be a very big problem when all these people go home," said an Asian diplomat from one of those secular nations now confronted by an underground Muslim movement. "They don't know anything but warfare. They're mere-

naries, and even in small numbers, they present a danger to any organized state."

If these are "mercenaries," however, the evidence here is that their payoff is mostly religious, not monetary. They may be ready to fight in foreign nations, but most will do so only to defend Islam.

Some analysts also contend that secular regimes in the region are exaggerating the threat posed by these Muslim warriors as part of a deliberate disinformation campaign to excuse their own misrule.

**I**ntelligence sources estimate that at least 10,000 Muslims from as many as 20 countries have trekked in the name of jihad to Afghanistan. An estimated 3,000 remain either there or in Pakistan. Some of the rest are alleged ready to have taken their battle far beyond the borders of South Asia.

The Algerian government, for example, asserts that fundamentalist militants involved in recent attacks on its army were trained in Afghanistan. The Tunisian government last year said it uncovered a coup plot involving fundamentalist insurgents from an underground movement called Ennahda (renaissance) who had fought alongside the Afghan *mujahedeen*. Authorities displayed a U.S.-made Stinger surface-to-air missile that the insurgents allegedly planned to use to blow up the Tunisian president's plane. The Stinger is a sophisticated weapon supplied by the CIA to the Afghan guerrillas at the peak of Soviet occupation.

Similarly, Jordan's interior minister said several of the eight members of the "Army of Mohamed" sentenced to death in 1990 for plotting against King Hussein had received their military training in the Afghan jihad. And many of the Muslim insurgents waging an armed guerrilla war for independence in the strategic north Indian state of Kashmir openly acknowledge that they not only fought in Afghanistan but purchased many of their weapons from *mujahedeen* stockpiles in and around Peshawar.

"The threat is very serious," insisted one North African diplomat. "These people don't want to live. They want only to fight. These are desperate people, and all our secular regimes are in danger."

Many of the Arab warrior-pilgrims who have fought in Afghanistan have been sponsored by the Cairo-based Islamic Brotherhood, which the Egyptians consider a constant threat to the secular regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Just two weeks ago, two burly Muslim leaders returning from the Afghan jihad announced in Peshawar that they were returning to Arakan state in western Myanmar (Burma) to battle a brutal, ongoing

Muslim purge by the country's Buddhist army.

The perceived threat from this movable army of jihad is such that several governments have exerted strong diplomatic pressure on Pakistan in recent weeks to take countermeasures. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif quietly answered these behind-the-scenes appeals last week by signing an order to ban all future visas to Muslim warrior-pilgrims and to encourage the ones already here—men like Miliani—to leave.

The order is being implemented by Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), which has helped coordinate the *mujahedeen*'s rebellion against Afghanistan's authoritarian, pro-Moscow regime.

"The ISI, which dealt with this problem all these years, has been asked to convey to all the *mujahedeen* leaders that such persons who are here on such a mission are no longer required," said Gulzar Khan, Pakistan's refugee commissioner. Khan, who has looked after the 4 million Afghan refugees and *mujahedeen* fighters who flooded Pakistan after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, added that if the foreign fighters refuse to leave, they will be deported.

Authorities on the foreign holy warriors in Peshawar stress that diplomatic pressure was not the only factor that led to the ban of young men once received in the overwhelmingly Muslim nation with a deep sense of Islamic brotherhood.

Commented one Western diplomat who has followed the Afghan war for several years: "I see it as a big problem here and potentially in Afghanistan. If there is a lot of pushing and shoving there, and if the U.N. peace plan fails in Afghanistan, these people could play a destructive role. I see that as a bigger problem than if they're dispersed to a jihad here and a jihad there. And certainly, the Pakistanis don't want a bunch of people around who are armed to the teeth and more radical and fundamentalist than the official government."

Tracing the evolution of the Muslim warrior phenomenon, Gulzar Khan also underscored the potential for unrest that the fighters present to Pakistan itself.

The man he credited most with calling the Muslims to jihad in Afghanistan was, in fact, murdered in Peshawar—possibly by the very force he helped recruit. Abdulla Izam, a Palestinian who came to Peshawar in the early 1980s and, in Khan's words, "galvanized a large number of Arabs to come and participate in the jihad" through books and pamphlets on the concept, was blown up in a car bombing several years ago.

Last year, Jamil ur Rehman, an Afghan *mujahedeen* leader who

relied heavily on financial support from Saudi Arabia and whose army included many Arabs, met a similar fate. He was receiving guests in the courtyard of his stronghold in the Afghan province of Kunar when an Egyptian mercenary knelt before him and, for unknown reasons shot him dead. Rehman's bodyguards riddled the assassin with machine-gun fire before he could be questioned.

**W**hat will happen when young fighters like Milani are expelled? Said Khan: "What I foresee for people like him is to go and stay in Afghanistan—marriage there, perhaps—and I think 3,000 people will not hurt Afghanistan, which has lost more than a million young men to this war."

Clearly, many of the young fighters cannot go home—at least not yet. Many of the Muslim warriors are Iraqi fundamentalists, all but exiled by the secular dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Others are Syrians, equally unwelcome under President Hafez Assad's version of Baath Arab secular socialism. And most of the pilgrim-warriors are from Saudi Arabia—the center of Islamic religious pilgrimage that, despite its fundamentalist trappings, is ruled by a Western-backed monarchy. That monarchy is singularly afraid of an Islamic revolt launched by returning veterans of the Afghan jihad.

"What Saudi Arabia did during the Afghan jihad was it encouraged these youngsters, these militants, to come over here," said a senior Pakistani intelligence officer. "The intelligence services in Saudi Arabia are there only to protect and prolong the royal family. So, when they found men who would be a potential problem, they gave them money, tickets, air fare and the necklace that would bring them martyrdom if they died in jihad, and they sent them here. They sent them here to kill them. It was very simple. This was a ploy."

Senior Pakistani officials confided that Islamabad has promised governments like the Saudi ruling family that they will share intelligence information on each holy warrior they deport. But at least one senior Pakistani official close to the prime minister reflected the harder Muslim line that remains in the government and that several analysts suspect will dilute the mercenary-expulsion order.

# Afghan Interim Rule: Rocky Road

By Denise Natali

**T**HE creation of an interim government in Afghanistan marks a new chapter in the country's quest for peace. Sibgatullah Mojadedi, a respected religious scholar and leader of the former Afghan interim government (AIG) exiled in Peshawar, Pakistan, from 1988 to 1991, was chosen by six of the seven major *mujahideen* groups to head the 51-member council for two months before a permanent Islamic government is set.

Opposing a compromise was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of the radical Hezb-i-Islami party. While Afghans celebrated President Mojadedi's inauguration, Mr. Hekmatyar's forces bombed Kabul to show a refusal to acknowledge a coalition government. Fights between government and Hekmatyar troops show the transition's volatility.

Yet the "Hekmatyar problem" is just one of many constraints facing the interim government. In

addition to ethnic, religious, and tribal feuding, Mojadedi must reckon with the disorderly transition process and find a way to maintain a legitimate regime.

One immediate task is filling ministry posts in a manner that does not aggravate rival political factions. Mojadedi must pacify minority groups such as the Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north, and Hazara Shiites in the south and west. Traditionally they've been left out of the Pahlavi-dominated central government.

At the same time, Mojadedi can't afford to alienate the Pathans, the country's largest ethnic population. His recent appointments excluded the Hazara and the Hekmatyar groups from major positions. Commanders left out created their own governing entities—adding to the chaos.

Doing this task in two months is unrealistic. Ethnic, religious, and tribal feuding has colored Afghan history for centuries. The traditional method of negotiating conflicts is through the *loya jirga*, or tribal council. *Jirgas* are not subject to strict schedules and it can take months or years to address simple problems. Deep issues, such as minority-group participation, will take longer than thought to resolve. Not lack of desire but cultural constraints will frustrate Mojadedi.

Mojadedi also has a past to overcome. As an Islamic scholar and rival of the former communist government, he is highly respected among Afghanistan's clergy, tribal leaders, and commanders. However, until his recent return to Kabul this month, Mojadedi had not been inside his country since he fled Daoud's Marxist regime in 1973. While fellow mujahideen fought in the jihad against the communist government, Mojadedi remained comfortably in Peshawar.

as refugees in Pakistan and Iran, or have been killed. Who will manage the ministries? During the AIG period, the public-health ministry tried to reconstruct a health-care system. But corruption, few funds, and inexperience hindered progress. Ministries were filled with relatives and friends; commanders cruised the streets of Peshawar in new Pajero jeeps. The AIG fiasco shows that even after Mojadedi forms a coalition government, the issue of legitimacy will remain.

Transition is complicated. Interim governments are typically a temporary solution to long-term problems. Within a limited time frame their leaders are expected to accomplish unrealistic tasks in a period of instability. The longer it takes Mojadedi to establish peace and construct a coalition government, the more impatient Afghans will get. After one week in office, Mojadedi suggested extending his term to two years. This may provide breathing space. However, by turning a short-term job into a long-term position, Mojadedi alters the nature of his "interim" regime. He also tests the patience of Afghans who have been promised a freely-elected government. Afghanistan shouldn't delegitimize this long-awaited step toward peace.

■ *Denise Natali of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington served on the transition team of the former Afghan interim government's ministry of health.*

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

May 13, 1992

THE LOOK



□ AFGHAN REBEL  
OR  
□ COMME DES GARÇONS ?

Peace be upon the Afghans

# Then there were three

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENTS IN KABUL AND MAZAR-I-SHARIF

**N**OT long ago the most important man in Afghanistan was Muhammad Najibullah. Since April 15th, when the former president went into hiding, apparently somewhere in Kabul, at least three men feel they have replaced him in importance.

General Abdul Rashid Dostam was Mr Najibullah's closest ally. His men had fought the mujahideen guerrillas more fiercely than any other government unit since the Soviet troops left the country three years ago. In March the general switched sides. He joined forces with the mujahideen in Mazar-i-Sharif. After that, support for the Najibullah government collapsed; Kabul soon welcomed both General Dostam and the guerrillas.

The general's main new ally is Ahmad Shah Masoud, who gained fame during the civil war as a resourceful commander. Together, General Dostam and Mr Masoud have been preventing the forces of another mujahideen leader, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, from taking over in Kabul. Mr Hikmatyar was the recipient of huge amounts of aid from Pakistan during the civil war, although the Pakistanis are now starting to feel they have backed the wrong man.

This was the background to this week's developments in Afghanistan. On May 25th Mr Masoud and Mr Hikmatyar signed an accord to end the fighting. In return for Mr Hikmatyar's promise to stop shelling Kabul, Mr Masoud said that he would get General Dostam to take his men out of the capital. Finally, it was agreed to hold a presidential election within six months.


It sounds wonderful. But will it work? Can Mr Masoud, who is now defence minister, keep order in Kabul without General Dostam's men? Probably not. Despite the accord signed this week, Mr Masoud con-

tinues to regard Mr Hikmatyar with deep suspicion and believes he will continue to try to seize power for himself in Kabul. Neither is it certain that General Dostam's men will leave. They remain the most powerful force in the country. The previous week Afghanistan's figurehead president, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, gave the general an extra star and said, in effect, that he had been a supporter of the mujahideen all along, despite killing thousands of them. That may seem odd, but the president was merely acknowledging the general's strength.

As for having a presidential election in six months, this seems like wild optimism, if the voting is to mean anything. Two years was previously thought to be the minimum time in which to prepare an electoral roll and make the other arrangements necessary for an election. Mr Mujaddidi is against an early poll, and said so during a visit to Pakistan on May 27th. He wants to stay as president, and objects to a proposal that he should step down at the end of June.

Afghanistan is, if anything, more divided than it was under Mr Najibullah. The emergence of three strong men, with more in the wings, may be a reflection of the way the country is going.


General Dostam wants Afghanistan to have a federal structure, with divisions in the north, south, west and east, based on the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar and Herat, with Kabul remaining the capital. The divisions could roughly follow tribal lines, with the Pathans in the south, the Hazaras and Uzbeks in the north, the Tajiks in the east and west. The provincial cities have always valued their independence. The mujahideen in Kandahar, who took over the city without fuss, are in no hurry to get involved with the squabbles in Kabul. Gul Agha, a mujahideen commander there, said only, "We will have relations with Kabul, of course, as long as we are given our rights."




Dostam makes his point

While the great men argue, the ordinary people are trying to rebuild their lives. For years the government-controlled cities were cut off from the rebel-controlled countryside. The roads are busy again with people visiting relations they may not have seen for a decade. Because of better communications and a stronger currency, prices of food and other goods have fallen by half. Even in Kabul, normality is taking over. Looting has been far less than was predicted after the stripping of Khost last year. Kabul does have a crime wave, but then, so do many cities elsewhere.

THE ECONOMIST MAY 30TH 1992



In accord: Masoud and Hikmatyar, with various friends



# Interim Ruler Seeks Longer Term

By Sharon Herbaugh  
Associated Press

KABUL, Afghanistan, May 5—Renegade guerrillas battered the capital with rockets again today, while Afghanistan's interim president suggested that he stay in office longer than originally agreed.

The proposal by Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, leader of a mainstream rebel group, to govern for two years instead of two months was almost certain to strain the fragile coalition of rebel factions that took power a week ago after the fall of the communist Afghan government.

The capital is under heavy attack by the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a bitter rival of the ruling council's military leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud. Hekmatyar, a hard-line Muslim fundamentalist, wants a stricter Islamic state than that envisioned by many members of the transitional government and favors quick elections.

Hekmatyar's guerrillas, who were forced from Kabul by Massoud's troops last week, bombarded this city of 1.5 million people with scores of rockets for a second straight day. Government troops fought back with artillery and warplanes from the ousted regime.

Today's fighting killed at least 40 people and wounded 200, most of them civilians, government and military officials said, with the two-day toll reaching at least 73 dead and nearly 400 wounded.

Mojaddidi told reporters today that he is the only leader with the broad-based support needed to stop the bloodshed after 14 years of war against a succession of Soviet-backed regimes and unite a country deeply divided along religious, ethnic and territorial lines.

He claimed to have talked to Afghans representing all religious and ethnic groups and said they believed his ruling council's term should be extended. But the idea was immediately rejected by other guerrilla factions.

The leaders of six of the seven main rebel groups previously agreed that Mojaddidi's 50-member council of military commanders and religious leaders should rule for only two months.

"I did not ask for this job. It was thrust on me," Mojaddidi told reporters as cannon and rocket launchers

roared outside the palace. "I have no demands, no desire to continue. But people have given their support to me and to the government. People trust me. They love me. They believe that I am the only person who can unite Afghanistan."

Hekmatyar has contended that the planned succession of ruling councils delays election of an Islamic government that can start rebuilding the country.

Mojaddidi called Hekmatyar an outlaw who could be crushed if the government wanted, but he urged the rebel leader to "leave his arms, come down and join his Muslim brothers and be part of this government."

A top Afghan army officer now supporting the interim council, Gen. Abdul Mohmin, said the army was waiting for Mojaddidi's orders to crush Hekmatyar's forces. "He's a fascist. He's Hitler," Mohmin said of Hekmatyar. "We will drive him from Kabul and then we will push him back into Pakistan."

Dawn brought a steady barrage of rockets from Hekmatyar's positions. Seven people died when a rocket hit the middle of Brezhnev's Bazaar, where stolen military goods were sold during the Soviet occupation and where vegetable and fruit vendors now sell their wares.

"We are poor. We don't have enough to eat, and what are these guys doing? Fighting for a seat" of power, said Abdul Sabur, 40, a vegetable vendor.

THE WASHINGTON POST, May 6, 1992



The Muslim \$25



AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

From the Editor:

On 6/29, the Asbury Park Press called Mojaddidi's handing over of the Afghan Gov't to Rabbani "the first peaceful transfer of power in this violence-wrecked country in nearly a century." We were pleasantly surprised as we had been unaware that Mojaddidi had had any power to transfer or that what was going on in Kabul was peaceful. So much for semantics; changes are taking place. Now if everyone would just leave the Afghans alone.....

The Kabul Times, in the 3 issues we've seen since April, has adopted new rhetoric & some green ink. We've reproduced the whole 5/14 issue - as it welcomes the new regime. The pictures won't come out well but the one (from the 5/30 issue) at the bottom of this page is typical. Why the articles are typewritten is a mystery.

We continue to be grateful to all of you who send us articles; please keep it up. We would like to feature organizations in the next issue, so if you belong to one, know of one, whatever, please let us know about its plans & activities. The deadline for the next issue is September 1.



AFGHANews, the publication of Rabbani's organization, is now being published in Kabul - P.O. Box 274, Kabul, Afghanistan - and sent with Saur Revolution stamps.



Ayatollah Nohsinee addressing leading body of intermediate - medical institute

# The fight goes on

**H**AJI PAINDA MUHAMMAD had a lucky escape. On June 24th he was in his courtyard, praying, when a rocket demolished his Kabul home. "Even the communists were better than this," he said. Living in the capital, it seems, has become rather more dangerous since April 25th, when the mujahideen took over the government from the Homeland (ex-Communist) Party regime of President Muhammad Najibullah.

Firs came a battle for Kabul between supporters of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Saudi-backed fundamentalist mujahideen leader, and forces loyal to Ahmad Shah Masoud, a celebrated mujahideen commander who is now defence minister. Mr Hikmatyar's men were driven from the capital, but Kabulis then suffered a long rocket and artillery barrage from the Hikmatyar forces, dug into the hills to the south. The barrage stopped on April 25th, after Mr Hikmatyar signed a deal for "lasting peace" with Mr Masoud, only to start up again on June 24th.

Mr Hikmatyar wants to rule Afghanistan and seems ready to sacrifice any number of Afghans to do so. He has refused to join the government until the Uzbek militia led by General Abdul Rashid Dostam leaves Kabul. Mr Hikmatyar says the militia is unacceptable because it used to support the former president (indeed, Mr Najibullah's downfall can be attributed directly to the defection of General Dostam). The real reason, however, is that General Dostam's militia is the biggest barrier between Mr Hikmatyar and power.

In the mujahideen government, such as it is, authority has been divided between the interim president, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, the 64-strong Jihad Council, which contains representatives from most mujahideen groups, and the smaller Leadership Council, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, who is made up of mujahideen leaders. The Jihad Council is supposed to act as a kind of lower house of parliament until elections are held, while the Leadership Council is supposed to be a dispute-resolving upper house. Both bodies are riddled with personal ambitions, and ethnic and religious differences—which means they accurately reflect Afghanistan and its problems.

Under a deal made by mujahideen groups on April 24th, Mr Mujaddidi was supposed to hold the presidency for only two months before handing over to Mr Rabbani, who was to run things until elections could be held. But Mr Mujaddidi (who has handed many plum jobs to various relations) refused to hand over to Mr Rabbani, whom he portrays, unfairly, as a Khomeini-like Islamic radical. However, he is reluctantly offered to relinquish his powers to the Jihad Council.

Nothing now seems likely to stop Mr Rabbani taking over as interim president. His first task will be to deal with Mr Hikmatyar. Unless Mr Hikmatyar orders an

end to the bombardment of Kabul and stops threatening to march on the city again, Mr Rabbani may have to send his forces against him.

Mr Rabbani also has to think about organising elections, a political practical unfamiliar to Afghans. He must try to accommodate the desire for (and expectation of) greater regional autonomy that has developed among Afghanistan's ethnic groups during 14 years of civil war. Regional autonomy has powerful backers. On June 23rd General Dostam (whom a Pakistani news agency said had been killed in an air crash two days earlier) gave warning that the government must devise a federal system "to guarantee ethnic rights", or face opposition. It is a warning that Mr Rabbani would be wise to take seriously.

THE ECONOMIST JUNE 27TH 1992

## Enter the professor

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT IN KABUL

**T**HE new president of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, is the first Afghan ruler to take power peacefully since 1901. That year the "Iron Amir", King Abdurrahman Khan, his enemies destroyed or cowed, died in bed and left the throne to his son, Habibullah.

Mr Rabbani assumed office on June 28th. The interim president, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, appointed after the fall of the Najibullah government in April, handed over power to the Leadership Council, made up of mujahideen leaders. The council then agreed to Mr Rabbani's appointment. Mr Mujaddidi refused to hand over power directly to Mr Rabbani because, it was said, he had wanted to keep the job for himself. Even this "peaceful" transfer of power had an edge to it.

Neither is there much peace in Kabul itself. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a fundamentalist-minded mujahideen leader, got it about right this week. "There's no security," he told reporters at one of his bases south of the capital. "There's no administration. There's a different government on each street. Every day there are clashes between various groups. People don't feel their lives, property and dignity are safe."

Mr Hikmatyar, however, is to blame for much of the chaos. He wants to rule Afghanistan. Having been thrown out of the capital by government forces, his men are mischievously firing in rockets from the outskirts. On July 1st fighting broke out in the centre of Kabul when some of Mr Hikmatyar's men moved in.

Can Mr Rabbani bring order to Kabul? A former theology professor in Kabul University, the new president is no "Iron Amir". Some of his followers complain privately that he tends to agree with whoever last bent his ear. He does, however, have the support of Ahmad Shah Masoud, who is one of the most successful mujahideen com-

manders, and, like Mr Rabbani, an Islamic intellectual.

The president is said to value consensus and gradualism over coercion as the way to build an Islamic society. However, time is not on his side. The cautious government has appointed him president for only four months, although presumably his term could be extended. Mr Rabbani and Mr Masoud want to set up a representative national gathering during the president's short term. The gathering would chart the country's course towards a general election not later than two years from now.

Meanwhile, what has happened to Mr Najibullah, for six years the强man of Afghanistan, who has not been seen in public since April 15th? An Afghan diplomat in Delhi was reported on June 26th to have said that Mr Najibullah was alive and "in the custody of the United Nations", presumably in Kabul. The diplomat said that Mr Najibullah had been granted an amnesty, along with other members of the former regime and "it was for the UN to decide his future". Mr Najibullah a prisoner of the UN? It all seems a bit rum.

THE ECONOMIST JULY 4TH 1992



The Nation 6/30

## United Nations Afghan envoy transferred

Benon Sevan, the UN Secretary-General's special envoy to Afghanistan, was replaced by Sotirios Mousouris, an Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, on June 19.

The transfer of Sevan took place after his failure to secure a political solution to the problem of Afghanistan.

# Ethnic discord endangering Afghanistan



Sher Agha, 19, leads a group of Shiite guerrillas who were released after four days of brutal captivity by rival Sunnis.

By Sharon Herbaugh  
Associated Press

**KABUL, Afghanistan** — Frightened and covered in filth, Sher Agha stumbled through a blinding dust storm to freedom after rebels abducted and tortured him.

When his captors opened the door of the steel shipping container that had been his prison cell, Agha stood for a moment, blinking and shaking. He was quickly surrounded by heavily armed rebels, he said, who prodded him

with rifles and told him to go home.

Agha was one of 250 Hazaras, or Afghan Shiite Muslims, held captive for three days by Ittehad-e-Islami, a rebel faction made up of Pathan-speaking Sunni Muslims.

The fact, aligned with Saudi Arabia, fears the centuries-old Pathan grip on power is being rapidly chipped away by Afghanistan's ethnic minorities.

Fighting erupted Tuesday between Ittehad-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Wahadat, a loose coalition of

eight small pro-Iranian groups demanding more rights and greater representation for the Hazaras in postwar Afghanistan. More than 100 people died and hundreds were injured before the two warring sides agreed to a tenuous truce Saturday.

About 2,000 Afghans like Agha, aligned to neither side in the struggle for power, became targets.

Ittehad-e-Islami pulled Hazaras off the city buses, out of their cars and off the streets, pinpointing them in the crowds by their dis-

"The torture was intolerable," said Nadir Ali, a 22-year-old Shiite candy maker who said he was grabbed by Ittehad-e-Islami fighters while walking to work on Tuesday. "They hit us with the butt of their guns and chains, saying, 'You have killed our brothers.'

He said he was crammed into a shipping container with about 50 other prisoners and given no food or water.

The rival factions accused each other today of having initiated the fighting.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

JUNE 7, 1992

## Ex-Soviets Still Stuck In Afghan Quagmire

Like Vietnam, MIA/POW Questions Linger

By William Branigan  
Washington Post Service

**KABUL, Afghanistan** — It has been more than three years since the last soldiers from the former Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan, but the letters keep landing on Vladimir Snegiryov's desk.

They plead for information about sons, brothers or husbands missing in the Afghan war. They demand to know what happened to the bodies, or why others possibly alive still are being held prisoner.

Snegiryov, a bearded former war correspondent here whose reporting on the Afghan conflict broke new ground in Soviet journalism, represents the Moscow-based Afghanistan Veterans' Committee.

Among its goals, he said, is to resolve the fate of 308 Soviet soldiers still listed as missing in action.

During the nine-year occupation of Afghanistan after the Soviets invaded in December 1979, this country became for the Soviet Union what Vietnam was for the United States: a quagmire that brought frustration to the government and anguish to the families that lost loved ones in an ultimately futile cause.

More than 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed fighting the Islamic guerrillas known as the *mujaheddin*, while about 58,000 Americans died in Vietnam, where the indigenous fighters were better armed and more numerous. It is estimated that more than 1 million Afghans

and a similar number of Vietnamese died in the two wars.

Compared with the 2,267 American servicemen listed as missing in action, the Soviet MIA toll is low. In part, this is attributable to the more open terrain of Afghanistan, the different style of combat of Soviet troops and the stronger air defenses of the Vietnamese.

For the families of the missing Soviet soldiers, the MIA issue is just as emotional as it is in the United States. In contrast to the so far fruitless search for living U.S. prisoners of war in Indochina, however, it is certain that some Soviet POWs are still being held by the mujaheddin.

Snegiryov said his best guess is that as many as 50 missing Soviet soldiers may still be alive in Afghanistan. Of the 308 MIAs, "we don't really know how many people now are living and how many have died," he said.

Snegiryov, who first came to Afghanistan in 1981, has visited about 15 times since then as a correspondent for the Pravda newspaper. He recently returned as a reporter for the Moscow paper *Trud*.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, which is charged with visiting prisoners of war, says it knows of no more than 20 Soviet captives and has received no recent information on their fate.

"We have not seen them for months now," one official said. He said he assumed that those held by the northern Afghan coalition of guerrilla commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, who has been named defense minister in the country's new mujaheddin government, would be released soon.

The Red Cross has formally stopped visiting prisoners and tracking missing persons as the result of the killing of one of its staff members, a medical worker from Iceland, on April 22 by a guerrilla of the radical Hezb-e-Islami group.

By appealing personally to mujaheddin commanders, Snegiryov said he has been able to secure the release of two soldiers of the former Soviet army.

The latest to be freed, he said, was an Uzbek, Bea Moradov, who was captured in October 1987 in Massoud's native Panjshir Valley. He was released on Massoud's or-

ders and went back to Uzbekistan April 21 through the rebel-controlled northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif, Snegiryov said.

However, he added, at least four other POWs are still being held by Massoud's men: a Russian, a Ukrainian, a Moldovan and another Uzbek.

Besides Massoud's prisoners, Snegiryov said, he knows of five POWs being held near the western Afghan town of Herat and about 15 in Pashtun areas in the south. Three other prisoners defected and are living with the mujaheddin, he said.

Recently, Snegiryov said, a delegation of American Vietnam veterans visited the Afghanistan Veterans' Committee in Moscow. "They promised to help us," he said.

"It's a big problem for our country," Snegiryov said. "A lot of [prisoners'] relatives don't understand why the mujaheddin don't free our people. They don't understand why the war finished three years ago and the prisoners are still being held."

WP 5/2

# Afghan Transition Threatens Disruptions in International Aid

By Colin Barracough

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN

**R**EBELS in Afghanistan may be trying to work out their differences, but friction is increasing among foreign aid agencies in Peshawar and between Kabul and Peshawar-based relief groups.

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1988, the communist government in Kabul controlled the major towns across Afghanistan, but left the rest of the country to the *mujahideen*. Such territoriality has affected the dispersal of aid, with aid workers in Peshawar squabbling over who has given the best care to the Afghan people.

Agencies based in Kabul, mainly affiliated with the United Nations, say they helped Afghans who suffered most those in battle zones. Peshawar-based groups counter that they have helped more people with 3 million refugees in Peshawar and more in rebel-controlled areas.

Kabul-based agencies were seen by Peshawar-based aid groups as recognizing the communist government. Those in Peshawar regarded the *mujahideen* as the true representatives of the Afghan people.

Meanwhile, aid distribution has been disrupted. Twenty of the 23 UN staff members were evacuated from Kabul before the *mujahideen* takeover of Kabul April 27, a UNICEF worker says. Projects such as UNICEF's food distribution program in Kabul have been abandoned until staff can return.

Oxfam and other aid agencies in Kabul such as Halo Trust, a de-

mining group, continue to offer services. But hospital workers in Jalalabad, the country's second largest city, complain about a desperate need for medicines and aid workers say feeble efforts at coordinating aid threaten to stall current and future projects.

The Peshawar-based Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Refugees (ACBAR) is expected to approach the Kabul government within the next few weeks to arrange work visas for aid agencies.

Jon Bennett, director of ACBAR, says that with a \$107 million annual budget, the private agencies held considerably more financial power than the UN with its \$20 million to \$25 million annual budget and considerably more sway with the new Kabul government. "Here we have long-established programs in the countryside, programs which the new government could not possibly build up," Mr. Bennett says. "We will go to the government and say, 'We are now part of your country.'"

Beneath the aid workers' sniping is a more serious issue, that of recognition of the former communist government in Kabul.

**M**ANY observers expect the incoming Islamic government in Kabul to take revenge on those who held sway in Kabul under the communist regime. They may extend this to the aid agencies who worked under the ousted government.

Aid committees who make it to Kabul are likely to disagree on the methods of working there. Peshawar-based workers say,

"All the agencies are basically territorial," says Stuart Worsley, project officer with British-run Afghanaid, based in Peshawar. "One agency will distribute grain

for free, while another agency up the road is selling theirs at full price." A coordinating body has been set up but at the moment operates only in Khost Province.

Aid workers are certain that they will not stay in Peshawar for long. Aid money, once directed solely to Peshawar in order to avoid the communist government, will flow increasingly to Kabul, aid workers say. Some donors are already changing their restrictions to favor agencies operating from Kabul.

Dependent on these contributions, the Peshawar groups are already ready to move to Afghanistan. French-run Avisen agency, which runs immunization programs at Ghazni inside Afghanistan, is trying to set up a base in Kabul. Afghanaid is looking for suitable premises in Kabul.

The Pakistan government is putting severe pressure on the agencies to leave, aid workers say. It is refusing to extend visas and is removing agencies' certification.

"The government in Islamabad will try to get us out of here soon," says aid worker from Avisen. "They never really liked having so many foreigners in this area, so near a sensitive border."

But for the millions of refugees who cannot yet return home, these changes may spell more misery: the Peshawar groups' money may dry up in the coming months, some aid workers say.

Even though the UN is offering cash and sacks of wheat to encourage refugees in Pakistan to go home, not many will return soon; few houses remain in the countryside after 14 years of war.

"They cannot even rent a home," a UN High Commissioner on Refugees spokesman says. "There are no homes left."

## UN continues to host the ousted dictator

Najib, the head of the communist regime, went into hiding in one of the UN offices in Kabul after an abortive attempt to leave the country. He is still the guest of the world body.

His brother, his personal secretary and bodyguard are with him, along with one woman and two children. It is said that they pass their time by watching TV. Najib is given permission by the UN to contact his wife in India through a satellite telephone.

The UN special envoy Benon Sevan tried to help Najib escape to India on April 16 after the *mujahideen* captured Bagram air base, 40 kilometers north of the capital. The attempt failed when security forces at the airport refused to allow the UN plane to leave with the fallen dictator on board.

The UN envoy justified his attempt to rescue Najib on the grounds that he had given him assurance of safe exit as part of a political solution under the UN auspices. The UN peace plan collapsed during its final stages when the *mujahideen* captured Charikar and Bagram Air Base.

The *mujahideen* have forgiven other members of the former regime. But some *mujahideen* argue that the general amnesty announced by the Islamic government does not apply to Najib, who resisted the *mujahideen* till the last day of his rule.

AFGHAN News June 1, 1992

RAVEENDRAN/AFP



FUEL OIL SHOP KABUL: Poor aid coordination has forced many Afghans to queue for hours for basic commodities.

# Worries Rise With Strict Islam Rule in Kabul

By MARK FINEMAN  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

**K**ABUL, Afghanistan—The old former Communist clicked his plastic worry beads and scowled. It was the precise moment, as it turned out, that Afghanistan's fierce Islamic rebels, who had battled the Soviet-style regime for the past 13 years, won their holy war—swarming the strategic capital with thousands of battle-scarred *mujahedeen* warriors.

But as he watched from his window as the jeeps of long-bearded fighters careened through the streets and claimed building after building in Kabul, Suleiman Layeq, the fallen regime's ideologue and poet, said he was more afraid for the future of his nation than for his life.

"The support of the mullahs is very dangerous—all the mullahs, all the brains of all the parties," he said of his Islamic religious counterparts, the powerful advisers in the myriad *mujahedeen* parties now ruling the Afghan capital through coalition. "Without exception, they follow the way of the fundamentalist aims and goals of Islam. And it is not Islam. It is a kind of theory against civilization—against modern civilization."

At the time, those words from a key architect of a regime that was collapsing all around him seemed to be an exaggeration. Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, the Islamic resistance leader installed soon afterward as Afghanistan's interim president, was, after all, widely considered a moderate. Ahmed Shah Masoud, the powerful guerrilla leader who helped pave his way to power, was similarly viewed.

But less than a month after the arrival of Afghanistan's first Islamic regime since the days of the proselytizing Mogul conquerors three centuries ago, such predictions were taking solid form.

The Islamic priests in Mojaddidi's coalition quickly laid down the new law: All alcohol is now banned in the Islamic republic; women cannot venture out in the streets without veils, and violations will be punished strictly according to Islamic *Sharia* law—a legal prescription for floggings, amputations and public executions.

The new edicts came quickly on the heels of other harsh measures that started Western analysts in the capital.

The coalition's new general secretary and official spokesman, a self-styled aya-tollah from one of Afghanistan's powerful Shi'ite sect *mujahedeen* parties, announced that the leadership was creating an "Islamic people's court for bringing justice against traitors and invaders."

When pressed on the new Islamic justice system that appeared to contradict an earlier announcement of general amnesty by Mojaddidi, the ayatollah confirmed: "A person who is guilty of violating Islamic law and the rights of the people, and the people don't like him, and they want him punished, they can take him to this court. We have announced a general amnesty, and the government's responsibility is over. Now it's up to the people."

With echoes of nearby Iran's revolution resounding through the Afghan capital and amid reports that one former regime official already had been tortured to death

in Kabul, Layeq, the ideologue, later reflected: "I want to stay. But I look at the situation, first, by where is the power and second, what is their first step."

"If they follow the policy of terror and the fundamentalist principles of Islam," he said, "this country is not a place where intellectuals can live. Me? I'm an old man. So it is not very important whether I go or I stay. I want to play a role in the new government. But what is important is the future of Afghanistan, and now it appears more and more that our future lies in our past."

**D**eepening the concern of Western analysts who sense that Kabul's new regime is slipping toward further fundamentalist Islamic tenets is a continuing standoff between the ruling coalition and the even more fundamentalist rebel faction of radical *mujahedeen* leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Negotiations have been under way between the coalition and representatives of Hekmatyar. But Masoud had made it clear that he has no intention of granting Hekmatyar's present demands, among them Mojaddidi's resignation and the removal from Kabul of several powerful former regime military now loyal to the Islamic coalition. Hekmatyar has vowed to renew attacks on Kabul if his demands are not met.

Now, ripples of concern are washing up as far away as Turkey and India over the increasingly fundamentalist policies of Kabul's tenuous ruling coalition, which has been further destabilized by fundamentalists who were left out of the alliance.

"My theory is, if Afghanistan falls to fundamentalist Islam, then the entire region falls—and increasingly, it's starting to look that way," a diplomat said in Ankara, Turkey, where an underground Islamic group has claimed responsibility for many bombings and assassinations in the past two years.

In New Delhi, capital of a nation long proud of its secular policies, a senior bureaucrat shook his head when he heard about the Islamic edicts in Kabul. "Well, that completes the belt of Islam that lies at our doorstep," he said of India, whose population of 850 million includes more than 100 million Muslims. "With an Islamic insurgency in Kashmir [the strategic northern Indian state], and a hostile Pakistan just beyond, these events must give us all pause."

Such concern also is being felt north of Afghanistan in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. There, former Communists from the previous Soviet regimes are increasingly embattled in their efforts to rule over Muslim-majority populations. And analysts said there is now an additional threat of an influx of refugees from Afghanistan's former regime.

Several former regime officials who had backed the Islamic takeover have reportedly fled to the old Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and a diplomat in Kabul said that more are likely to follow.

"But there is a very positive side to the exodus of refugees from here to these new;

states of Central Asia," the diplomat added. "If there are a lot of technocrats from the regime here going there, I think those republics will be happy. They need them there. It's the fundamentalism that presents the real threat to these Central Asian leaders. They are unpopular regimes, and they're ripe for revolution."

**C**learly, though, Afghanistan's neighbor to the east, the Islamic state of Pakistan, is watching with most concern Kabul's fundamentalist drift.

In Islamic Pakistan, which has alternated between moderation and fundamentalism in its 45 years as an independent state, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has embarked on a course to try to marginalize the fundamentalists—in his country and in Afghanistan, as well.

In a bold move, Sharif braved incoming rocket, artillery and tank fire and flew to Kabul within hours of Mojaddidi's rise to power. He stayed long enough to lend support to Mojaddidi's rule and send a message of repudiation to fundamentalist leader Hekmatyar and the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami political party, which has staunchly backed the radical Afghan leader for more than a decade. In response, Jamaat-i-Islami, which represents 10% of the vote in Pakistan's National Assembly, withdrew its support of Sharif's coalition government in Islamabad.

Senior ideologues of the Pakistani fundamentalist party have camped in Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel, where they effectively banned alcohol and barred women not wearing veils days before Mojaddidi's coalition officially followed suit.



Women wear Muslim attire in a Kabul market

# In Kabul, Islam Is Law — But Confusion Rules

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Kabul, Afghanistan — Laiya Khan isn't fond of wearing scarves. She likes the feel of the wind through her hair. So when she came to work yesterday bundled in baggy clothes and with her head shrouded in red cloth, colleagues giggled.

Khan laughed back. Across from her in the international news division of the Baktar news agency was M. Katalwazi, her boss. Just two weeks ago he sported a suit. Now he wore a cream-colored shalwar kameez, a pajama-like outfit favored in Islamic countries. "Look at this," said Katalwazi. "Are we really becoming a Muslim nation?"

Ten days into the Islamic republic of Afghanistan, daily life has become confusing. The government has issued a few orders to guide its people. Effective yesterday, it banned the consumption and sale of alcohol and ordered women to wear "Islamic dress," which means only the hands and face may be shown in public. Failure to obey is punishable by flogging.

Still, in this society not prone to fundamentalism, anomalies remain. At Kabul's biggest movie theater, "Rambo III" is a blockbuster. "It's an Islamic movie," Bemulah Khan, the 47-year-old director of the theater said with a straight face. "Rambo kills Russians."

Next in line, however, is "RoboCop II." "Oh, that's one's OK," Khan said. "It's a technical movie. It has lots of science." The only thing banned, he said, is sex.

Interpretation of the new rules is slightly hair-raising because many of Afghanistan's self-appointed rule-makers, the mujahideen, have guns. Every man has his own law. At Babur's garden, cockfighting was in full swing yesterday. Mohamed Amir's chicken had just poked out an eye in a competing bird, winning the farm's \$500 — more than three times an average yearly salary.

"Soon we will end all this," said Mohammed Agar, a 28-year-old mujahideen with an AK-47 automatic rifle between his legs. "Gambling is un-Islamic. We will make Afghanistan like Iran."

Daily life in Kabul is more than a struggle with vagaries of Islamic law. Food is another problem, as is the prospect of continued fighting among guerrillas.

"Only God knows what will happen to Afghanistan," said Mohammed Araf, whose family has run a prayer-head dealership near Kabul's Blue Mosque for three generations. At the Mandawa Kabul flour market yesterday, merchants were refusing to sell to several hundred angry customers because they said government-controlled prices would ruin them.

Grain merchant Abdul Rhani said he was facing a \$30 loss on every 216-pound bag of flour if he sold at the government price. "That could put me out of business," he said.

But engineer Jaber Ali demanded that Rhani make a sale. "My house is empty of wheat," he said. "We have five people to feed. We have no bread."

And the struggle between the spirit and the stomach, Kabul residents have somehow found time for the senses. Near the center of town, a florist selling potted roses was doing a fast business. "They are sweet to the nose and good for the heart," said a man who was loading one onto his bicycle. "Roses are especially important during these difficult days."

NEWSDAY, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1992



## Afghan Women Fret Behind Islamic Veil

THE liberation of the Afghan capital by Islamic mujahideen guerrillas made 19-year-old Jina Karim a virtual prisoner in her own home.

Ms. Karim did not leave her parents' cramped two-room apartment in a Soviet-built housing block in southern Kabul for weeks after the mujahideen ousted the Communist regime in late April and installed an Islamic government. She stayed home of her own free will — mainly out of fear that she would incur the wrath of Afghanistan's new leadership if she left.

"I'm worried about the Islamic dress," she said, a despairing look spreading over her face. "I've never worn a veil and I don't want to wear one. I prefer modern clothes." She continued. "I'd rather stay at home than go outside covering my head."

While Jina's stance may represent an extreme, her comments underscore the concern felt by some educated, relatively cosmopolitan women in Kabul. Some admit privately they are wary of the new Islamic government, believing it eventually wants to take away the rights women gained during the Communist era.

So far, the only action taken by the government to roll back women's rights has been the order to cover up, issued shortly after the mujahideen takeover. But some, like Jina, fear the government eventually will try to restrict women's access to education and jobs. "I'd like to become a secretary, but I doubt that will be possible now because the Islamic government probably will not permit women to work," she says.

Matiawi al-Salah Rakhami, Afghanistan's Islamic Affairs minister, insists such fear is unfounded. As long as women obey the Islamic law, he says, they will be allowed to work in any capacity.

The government's position could change, however. The new power structures remain largely undefined, as rival mujahideen factions have been embroiled in a battle for influence.

A peace agreement between the factions calls for early elections. If representatives of the largest and most fundamentalist Islamic faction, the Hezb-e-Islami, do well in the elections they could impose their fundamentalist values on the country.

Yet even if they wanted to, the authorities wouldn't be able to banish women from the workplace anytime soon, argues Masoumi Wardak, minister of education under former Communist President Najibullah.

"The government can't afford to remove women from the workplace because there are simply not enough qualified men to take their place," she says, adding that about 75 percent of Afghanistan's teachers are women. Ms. Wardak also said women in the capital would not have much difficulty in adapting to the new conditions. "It really isn't bad. It's part of our tradition: women in the countryside have always covered their heads. It won't be so hard for women in Kabul to do the same."

One prominent working woman, television news reader Najiba Haidar, gladly accepted the Islamic dress code, saying her desire to continue working outweighed all other considerations.

"I want to stay here and work, so I do it," Ms. Haidar said, as she sat in a dressing room at Kabul's television center.

But Jina Karim says emigration is her only option. "I'm not angry. I'm just sad," she said of her decision to leave the country.

"All my friends have already gone," she says. "They knew the mujahideen were about to come to power, and they didn't like them, so they left a few months ago."

Kabul, Afghanistan — A complete breakdown in law and order has left this city collapsing into chaos just seven weeks after victorious Muslim guerrillas captured the Afghan capital to end 14 years of civil war. "The government is weaker than the people," acting Kabul police chief Abdul Haq complained recently. "Armed groups in Kabul ... have tanks, stingers [antiaircraft missiles], mortars and multiple rocket launchers."

Kabul is ruled by guerrilla groups and former troops of the fallen communist government who have pledged allegiance to the new defense minister, Ahmad Shah Massood. But regional rivalries, party politics, religion, language and ethnicity divide the armed groups, spurring constant violence.

Kabul's small diplomatic community has evacuated most families and some nonessential personnel. The United Nations has announced it will assemble a uniformed police force for the city beginning next week, but most people remain sceptical. "All of these forces with their tanks and rocket launchers should be withdrawn from the city," said shopkeeper Mohamed Yasin, 30. "They worry the people and make it impossible to maintain security." The Defense Ministry in Kabul receives regular complaints against guerrilla forces and former government troops ranging from car theft and looting to murder. "Every report is like a needle driven into our hearts," a ministry official said. "The people come to us and say: 'Is this the Islamic Republic you fought to create?'"



*'Yes, we are living,' says American-trained university professor M. Akbar Popal.*

*'But as a matter of fact, most of the people here, they are really in a bad bell.'*

WP Magazine 4/26

## Chaos

# Behind the veil, again

Kabul's women don *chadors* and wonder about Islamic rule

By Ahmed Rashid in Kabul

**W**hen rockets lit up the sky and there was no escaping the thunder of artillery shells, women were the first to disappear from the narrow, winding streets of Kabul as mujahideen guerrilla factions last month battled for victory. Then came this month's ceasefire, and Kabul's bazaars and offices and shops opened again. But the women have not returned.

Perhaps the most dramatic but understated effect of the recent turmoil in Kabul has been what it means for women in Afghanistan. In Kabul these are troubled days for educated, professional women who wonder whether they will be able to continue studying and working. Their apprehension is a pressing political and social problem for the loose coalition of guerrilla commanders and religious leaders who took the reins of power. And as the new Islamic government attempts to exert control after 14 years of war, women interviewed in Kabul say they are waiting to see what changes are in store for women throughout the country.

Even as the fighting continued in Kabul, one of the first edicts the new mujahideen government passed was that all women had to cover their heads in public and wear the traditional *shalwar kameez* or baggy trousers and long shirt.

When the former education minister and renowned feminist Masouma Ismat Wardak, arrived for a meeting with President Sibghatullah Mujahedi, dressed in a long skirt and a scarf that covered her head, she was turned away by his bodyguards and told to come back "after having dressed properly."

"I do not know what the future holds for women. It worries me more than anything else at the moment," she said in an interview. "Will women be allowed to continue going to university and apply for jobs," she asked.

Kabul's young women were suddenly dusting off their mother's old *chadors*, and a handful of women on the streets were fully veiled, hiding their skirts and high heels under billows of cloth reaching from their head to their ankles. Several secretaries said they had donned a full-length *chador* because they could not afford to replace their skirts with new *shalwar kameez*. The price of a *chador* shot up from Afs 20,000 (US\$40) to Afs 60,000 and the market ran out of them. Pathan truck drivers in Pakistan began a roaring business importing readymade *chadors* from Peshawar.

Outside Aziz Gul's dyeing shop, hundreds of *chadors* in all shades of blue were hanging out to dry after they had been repaired, washed and dyed. "Many women have brought out their old family *chadors* which they have never worn and want them dyed in brighter colours. There is a huge demand and my shop is running 24 hours at the moment," he said.

When the new government asked civil servants to return to work, many offices remained half empty because 40% of lower paid jobs in government offices are staffed by women, who are still fearful of returning to work. When schools were officially reopened, more than half the students and most teachers, who are women, did not turn up either.

Those who did were witnesses to the destruction and looting of books, paper and even desks, chairs and blackboards by the various militias patrolling the city. Outside most schools heavily armed mujahideen guards were stationed, checking that the girls were properly dressed. The end of the war has only exacerbated the enormous problems in Afghanistan's education system, ranging from a chronic shortage of schools to an already low rate of female literacy.

Kabul University, which has 10,000 students, still has not opened and poses an even bigger problem for the government, because it has always been co-educational, with young boys mixing freely with girls who once wore tight jeans and short skirts.

At a girl's medical hostel, which houses students who could not return to their homes in the war-torn interior of the country, the hostel superintendent locked the gates and confined the girls to their rooms. "We don't know what is going to happen at the university but if the mujahideen want us to wear the veil we will," said Aziza Sadiq, a medical student.

For the tens of thousands of young rural women who will be returning from the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, it will be the first time they see their country. Rural existence, in which days are filled shepherding flocks, working the land, cutting wood and providing enough food and clean water for the family, is an alien one to many of these young women. Along with relearning the skills of their mothers, they will face the extra hazard of

working in the midst of minefields. The war has left some 10 million mines scattered across the country.

During the war, women in the refugee camps, especially those under the control of hardline fundamentalists, led circum-

scribed lives. They were not allowed to study, since girls schools which taught anything other than the Koran were closed down. And women in these camps were not allowed



All heads are covered in Kabul these days.

to work outside the camps or even see male doctors.

And as these women leave the camps and return to the villages they will often live side-by-side with the families of former officials from the Watan party, who sent their families out of Kabul as the mujahideen approached. The returning refugee women and the women who helped the communist regime will have major problems in adjusting to each other.

Apart from passing edicts on the proper Islamic appearance of women in public, the government has done or said little to guarantee women's political rights. There are no women in the 36-man mujahideen cabinet, and some fundamentalist parties are insisting that if elections are held, women should not be eligible to vote.

Defining the role of women in Afghan society is bound to fuel further infighting among the mujahideen factions. Debate over the proper Islamic policies towards women — who are the most politically vulnerable — could easily become a rallying point as liberals and fundamentalists square off for long-term power in Afghanistan.

The FORUM talks to

NANCY HATCH DUPREE, who came through New York at the end of June on her way back to Peshawar to resume her work as Senior Consultant to ACBAR after a month's vacation in the US.

Never one to goof off completely, Nancy spent some vacation time furthering the fundraising for the Louis Dupree Fellowship Program. To date, \$60,000 of the \$250,000 goal has been raised, solely from friends and admirers of Louis. The Social Science Research Council, which will administer the Fellowships, will solicit corporate and foundation grants and Nancy will continue to contact friends & colleagues until the goal is met. Nancy hopes this will happen soon; all contributions will be welcomed and are tax deductible.\* In the meantime, SSRC will offer a Louis Dupree Prize of \$1,000, which will not be taken from the fund's principal, to the most outstanding proposal for dissertation field research in Central or Inner Asia. The first prize will be awarded in the Spring of 1993.

In Peshawar, Nancy's main concern is ARIC, the ACBAR Resource & Information Centre, which she hopes will continue to serve as a central repository for all development information regarding Afghanistan. ARIC already has over 4,000 documents from NGOs, the UN, EEC & bi-lateral gov't agencies on current projects - both refugee & cross-border - as well as books & other reference material on all aspects of Afghanistan. She hopes that ARIC, when it moves to Kabul, will become the Afghan Resource & Information Centre.

One of ARIC's components, dear to Nancy's heart, is a research program directed to collecting information & statistics on Afghan women. The program also acts as an advocate for the inclusion of women in all development-oriented projects in Afghanistan. ARIC, with an all-Afghan staff, sponsors seminars conducted by Afghan women to give them experience in & a platform for articulating their problems & aspirations.


The Peshawar to which Nancy is returning is in an even greater state of flux than usual. Traffic between Peshawar & Jalalabad is especially heavy, particularly on weekends, as exile Afghans go there to check on the security of the area & the condition of their property. Former Kabulis do the same although they tend to stay a week or so in Kabul.

Although the UNHCR reports that between 4 & 5 thousand people per day are returning to Afghanistan, most go to the rural border areas. What is not reported are the increasing numbers of Kabulis who are coming to Peshawar for the first time. In Kabul now, there is plenty of food but it is very expensive; security is shaky; robbery is on the increase. The newcomers plan to return to Kabul eventually, so they come without their worldly goods, but their length of stay is indefinite. Since there is no longer a structure for admitting new refugees, the newcomers "visit" family or former colleagues, creating incredible hardships for Afghan families living in Peshawar. For example, a couple with 2 small children, living in a small house, suddenly find themselves hosting 22 new "guests," 15 of which are children! In this particular house, which is typical, there is only one wage earner. The "guests" have brought no money & there is no way for them to get jobs, & even to suggest this or raise the subject would be impolite. So the wage earner, who usually is paid monthly, is out of cash by mid-month.

Many long-standing urban refugees are not eager to return to Kabul until they have some assurance that a moderate leadership is in firm control of the gov't. They don't want to exchange even a low-paying job in Peshawar for the uncertainty of not knowing who might employ (and pay) them in Kabul.

---

\*Contribution checks can be made payable to the Social Science Research Council & sent to SSRC 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158. Mark on the check "for the Louis Dupree Fellowship Fund."



However, some Kabulis do come to Peshawar just to visit and/or attend weddings. Nancy reports that marriage fever has struck; there are proxy weddings - the bride in Kabul, the groom in Germany or London, the ceremony in Peshawar - as well as the regular kind with all parties under the same roof, or tent. Nancy has no analytical information for this current phenomenon, but she hopes to have time, at some point, to collect some data.

As far as organizations returning to Kabul, Nancy says that UNOCA has urged the 160-odd NGOs in Peshawar not to go running back to Kabul all at once as it would be unfair to burden a new gov't with all the logistics so soon. The UNOCA request was underscored by Jalalabad's mayor Abdul Kadir's message to Peshawar: "We need you, we want you, we love you, but not right now. My major problem is security. I can't take the time to give you a cup of tea & I can't afford to give you a pilau. It would hurt me not to be able to fulfill my obligations of hospitality, so please don't put me in that embarrassing situation."

While ARIC has no plans to shift to Kabul in the near future, Nancy hopes to make a reconnoitering trip as soon as circumstances permit.

\* \* \*

The FORUM listens to

SIMA WALI, Executive Director of Refugee Women in Development, who spoke at a round-table sponsored by the Refugee Project of the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights & the Women's Commission for Refugee Women & Children on 7/15 in New York City.

Ms. Wali said that Afghans still make up the largest refugee population in the world & that the majority are women & children, many of whom have been crippled, widowed & otherwise traumatized by 14 years of war. [While the UN says many refugees are returning daily, Ms. Wali pointed out that many of those are male fighters going in to reclaim their turf as well as Pakistani & Saudi mercenaries. She said that Afghans were leaving Kabul at the rate of 1,000/day.]

Large numbers of women inside Afghanistan have, because of the war, become heads of families. Now, however, they are being targetted: they can no longer go to their jobs; education is denied them as schools are closed; they are attacked & accused of collaboration. [This last is posing a problem for US immigration as some women are applying for asylum. How can the US provide asylum from a gov't it helped install!]

Ms. Wali expressed concern that repatriation agencies may not work in tandem with development agencies & that neither may have experience in dealing with traumatized women. And the agencies will have to work within the framework of Islam. To do this they will have to consult the women as they are the ones who will know what will work best in their own culture. The women must be made aware of their rights, however, as culture has been used, even by int'l agencies, as a way of keeping women out of the development process.

Afghan women willingly played 2nd fiddle to the men during the war, but now they are beginning to feel it is their turn. They are very much aware of what is happening & they are very concerned about their rights. Ms. Wali proposes that Afghan women be trained in human rights - "legal literacy" - in order to ensure that women's concerns are included at the outset of any new legislation or constitution. She stressed the importance of Afghan women having access to information about the development of women's rights in other countries, particularly in the Middle East. For example, in some countries various interpretations of the sharia are being studied & compared - by both male & female scholars - with views to new interpretations. "The sharia was man made, not God given." Afghan women should be included in any worldwide womens' information network. For more information, contact Sima Wali, Refugee Women in Development, Inc., 810 First Street, NE, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20002.

# Afghani restaurant offers a nice change

By Jonathan Rogers

Staff writer

Jacksonville is no stronghold for ethnic food restaurants, but the market is growing.

One example is Kabul Kabob on University Boulevard. Reasons to go: Afghani food is inexpensive, good quality, and it's different. Face it, life's too short not to try an adventure now and then.

Start with oddly named appetizers aushak and sambosa (\$2.50 each). Aushak are small, tart-like triangular pastries — two to an order — flaky dumplings filled with chopped leeks and green onions with yogurt and meat sauce. There's a sprinkling of mint too, signaling the sort of gastronomic excitement Afghani food brings to the table.

The sambosa is even more popular, a half-dozen small fried open-top pastries filled with ground beef and a chili-like sauce topped with yogurt. For extra fun, ask for hot-hot sauce made with select minced peppers, onions and what may be another dash of mint. Even your sinuses will perspire.

Entrees feature kabobs — chicken, lamb, beef — ranging from about \$6 to \$6.50. We've

**Food:** Three stars out of five.  
**Service:** Medium to slow.  
**Atmosphere:** Budget Afghani.  
**Prices:** inexpensive. Most entrees are \$6 to \$9.

**Kabul Kabob**, one block northwest of University Boulevard at 5781-1 Benney Road, is open from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. Monday through Friday, 5 to 10 p.m. Sunday through Thursday, 6 to 10 p.m. Friday, 11 a.m. to 10 p.m. Saturday and noon to 9 p.m. Sunday. Non-smoking seating is available; MasterCard, Discovery, VISA. No alcoholic beverages; handicapped access. For information call (904) 730-5038.

tried them all and all are good, with the chicken and lamb edging out the beef, but just barely.

All are served with aromatic brown rice and the meats are marinated in lemon juice and herbs. The lamb is dusted with an exotic, peppery preparation that owner Wahid Nawabi swears is simply ground-up dried grapes, but which tastes as if it has salt, pepper and garlic mixed in.

Vegetarian entrees of sauteed spinach, string beans or cauliflower stew with onions, tomatoes, ginger and herbs are \$5.50. Desserts include baklava (\$2.50)

and a rice pudding topped with pistachio nuts (\$2.75).

The blend of flavors in all dishes reflects the mixture of cultures that have flowed through Afghanistan's trade route mountain passes for 3,000 years. Because the country is several hundred miles from the ocean, seafood is essentially non-existent in traditional diets.

Kabul Kabob has no license for alcoholic beverages, but you may bring your own, or wash the spicier dishes down with cold soft drinks. We like the Afghan black tea (cup, \$1; pot, \$2) which has a slightly perfumed taste. There's a sour yogurt drink called Afghan dough (\$1.25), but our spirit of adventure climbed down off its camel before we got that far.

The only disappointment is the bread. Until Nawabi gets his tandoor brick oven — one has been custom ordered from India — he's serving plain pita bread. When the oven comes, traditional chewy nan bread will nicely round out the meals.

Nawabi has done a good job transforming a small plain strip mall location into a pleasant dining spot with wall hangings and native music to complement his menu.

Florida Times Union 7/?

# Seizure of hot drinks

Worth Af's 10 million alcoholic drinks were seized in Kabul city tenth precinct in line with the instruction of the Islamic State of Afghanistan on banning the sale and consumption of such drinks.

The seized bottles were destroyed in presence of an authorized team, reported BIA reporter.

KT 5/30 (BIA)

# \$25 and Under | Eric Asimov

It's a verifiable equation: when a Government falls anywhere in the world, restaurants rise in the United States. Let's face it, political change rarely cures poverty or resolves antipathies, but it almost always benefits American diners.

After the Vietnam War, Vietnamese restaurants opened all over the United States, run by new immigrants and catering to a ready market of refugees missing the tastes of home as well as to Americans. After Governments changed in Iran, Ethiopia and, most recently, Haiti, new restaurants sprouted up all over, replaying this centuries-old American process of immigration and assimilation.

Such was the case with Caravan, a four-year-old Afghan restaurant owned by Ibrahim Muhammed and Ghulam Haider. Mr. Muhammed had been the chef at the Afghan Embassy in Washington for four years when he decided to seek asylum in the United States in 1979 for political and economic reasons. Mr. Haider, his cousin, was then a refugee from the war in Afghanistan, staying in the United States Embassy in India. Mr. Muhammed helped Mr. Haider come to New York, where he attended City College. On finishing his studies, he and Mr. Muhammed, who had cooked at and managed a number of restaurants, decided to open their own place in New York.

Seeking a foothold in crowded, touristy midtown, they chose a steamy block on Eighth Avenue near the theater district, an urban counterpart to the barren, rugged terrain for which Afghanistan is famous. Adventurous diners must traverse a Khy-



THE NEW YORK TIMES JUNE 19, 1992

## Caravan

741 Eighth Avenue, at 46th Street, Manhattan, (212) 262-2021.

**Best dishes:** Scallion-and-meat dumplings; chickpea, meat and vegetable turnovers; minced beef kebab; chicken kebab; lamb-and-spinach stew, and lamb-and-eggplant stew.

**Price range:** \$10 to \$16.

**Credit cards:** American Express, Diner's Club, Mastercard and Visa.

**Hours:** Noon to 11:30 P.M. daily

**Wheelchair access:** all on one level.

ber Pass of adult-video stores and similarly seedy establishments to reach Caravan, but their reward is a quiet, calm refuge where they can relax over savory kebabs and fiery stews.

The carpeted, rectangular dining room, seating about 85, holds neat rows of tables covered with soft tablecloths and bearing red linen napkins. Tapestries depicting folksy mountain scenes line the walls, and sinuous music lulls quietly in the background. Mr. Haider, a gracious presence in the dining room, is quick to offer suggestions or recommendations as he brings over a basket of oblong wedges of fresh flatbread.

Ashak (\$3.50), steamed scallion-and-meat dumplings covered with a refreshing mint-scented yogurt sauce, is a delightful way to start. Sambusa (\$2.95) is a spicier appetizer, crisp fried triangular turnovers containing chickpeas, ground beef and

mixed vegetables, served with a yogurt-and-lemon dipping sauce. Boulaneek kadou (\$3.25) is an unusual fried turnover filled with puréed pumpkin, fragrant with cinnamon and nutmeg and almost sweet enough for dessert.

All 10 kebabs come with enormous portions of nutty basmati rice and grilled tomatoes. The naan va kebab (\$9.95), minced beef mixed with onions and spices and fashioned into a submarine-size cylinder, is spicier than the shishlick (\$10.25), a domino row of tender chunks of grilled beef. Morgh (\$10.75), bite-size chunks of chicken breast marinated in lemon and then grilled, was almost hidden in the rice. Only the barch kebab (\$10.75), grilled lamb marinated in yogurt, was tough.

Even the satisfying kebabs can't overshadow the delicious peppery slow-cooked stews, including chalow sabzi (\$9.25), tender lamb served in a sauce scented with coriander and garlic over rice with spinach, and quorma badenjan (\$9.25), another lamb dish, served with eggplant, onion, peppers and tomatoes. There is also an array of vegetarian dishes.

Desserts, including a creamy rice pudding (\$2.25) and a gelatinous saffron pudding studded with nuts (\$2) are a bit of an afterthought, a bland contrast to the spicy fare.

Four years at Caravan have taught Mr. Muhammed and Mr. Haider a lot about running a business in America, they say. Like the importance of ambition and expansion. They are now planning a second restaurant on the Upper East Side.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Publications listed in AFGHANISTAN INFO, #31, March, 1992:

MOSCOW AND THE MIDDLE EAST. SOVIET POLICY SINCE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN by Robert O. Freedman; 1991, no publisher given. 438 pp. \$35.

AFGHANISTAN: A NATION OF MINORITIES by Nassim Jawad. A Minority Rights Group Int'l Report 92/2.379; London, 1992. 36 pp. \$3/95.

BACTRIA. AN ANCIENT OASIS FROM THE SANDS OF AFGHANISTAN by Giancarlo Ligabue & Sandro Salvatori; Erizzo, 1991.

"Exil, relations interethniques et identite dans la crise aghane" by Pierre Centlivres in DES ETHNIES AUX NATIONS EN ASIE CENTRALE, the Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Meditteranee, # 59-60; 1991/1-2, Aix-en-Provence. Pp. 70-82.

\* \* \*

EVERYDAY ISLAM - RELIGION & TRADITION IN RURAL CENTRAL ASIA by Sergei P. Poliakov, Moscow State Univ., Edited by Martha B. Olcott, Colgate University; June 1992. M.E. Sharpe, 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, NY 10504. 180 pp., photos, glossary, index. ISBN 0-87332-673-3. \$35.

Behind the veil of protracted subservience to Moscow, Islamic traditionalism—everyday Islam—has not only survived but has flourished and is resurgent in Central Asia today. In chapters rich with previously inaccessible information about marital customs, the upbringing of children, communal decision making, social prestige and values, and the "second" economy in Central Asia, Poliakov demonstrates the resilience of an "un-Soviet" way of life supported by underground institutions, fostered by "unofficial" clergy, and protected through the infiltration and subordination of government and party organs. In an extensive introduction to the translation, Martha B. Olcott underscores the unique contribution of Poliakov's field research but also adds a new level of complexity to the work by identifying how it perceives traditional society through the prism of Soviet social science.

THE HARAPPAN CIVILIZATION & ITS WRITING by Walter A. Fairservis, Jr; 1992, E.J. Brill, 24 Hudson St., Kinderhook, NY 12106. vii + 239 pp. ISBN 90 04 09066 5. \$47.

AN AFGHANISTAN PICTURE SHOW OR, HOW I SAVED THE WORLD by William T. Vollmann; 1992, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 19 Union Square West, New York, NY 10003. 268 pp., chronology, sources, illus. From the flyleaf: "Vollman paints a brutally honest & dryly comic portrait of a young American coming to terms with his political naivete. It is the story of a perpetual stranger, unable to comprehend the simplest things he hears & sees, & continually compelled to rely on others for help. In two narrative perspectives, Vollman wryly confronts his own inadequacy in the face of limitless suffering & comes to the realization that one who went to aid & to understand [Afghanistan] could only hope, trust & receive."

"Italie-Afghanistan 1921-1941, The Journal of the Engineer A. DeGado" by May Schinasi in ANNALI, Instituto Universitario Orientale, Naples, v.50, fasc. 3 (part 2), 1990. Pp.279-293 + photos. Part 1, "De l'affaire Piperno à l'évacuation de 1929," appeared in fasc. 1 of vol. 50, pp. 177-216.

ISLAMIC ETIQUETTE (in Pashtu) by Mahmood Darswal, Cultural Council of Afghanistan Resistance, Islamabad, 1991. 579 pp.

Where do many new immigrants go when they want to get an immigration lawyer, a tax consultant or a physician they can talk to? Where do they go to find their national food, or a newspaper or church service in a language they can understand?

Why to the Yellow Pages, of course, but not necessarily the telephone companies' books. Many immigrants instead turn to any one of numerous ethnic directories. . . .

The Iranian Yellow Pages has grown to 1,008 pages, from 98 pages a decade ago, says Bijan Khalili, chairman of the Ketaab Corporation in Van Nuys, Calif. Ketaab publishes a Farsi-language directory and a pocket version, with listings from 10 states, including New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, and mails some 37,000 free copies a year to Iranian immigrants, mainly in Southern California.

**THE NEW YORK TIMES**  
**APRIL 13, 1992**

"In line with the cultural policy of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, a great number of books considered against... Islam & the Sharia have been eliminated from the Public Library & the Baihaqi publishing outlets." Moh'd Sidiq Chakari, Acting Minister of Information & Culture is in charge of purging the country of books published & released during the communist regime. KT 5/30

## CHRONOLOGY

4/14 - CSM - Last week Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami Party broke with the Gov't of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif over the Gov't's Afghan policy. Sharif is backing the mujahideen gov't in Kabul while the Jamaat activists support Gulbuddin.


4/29 - AFGHANews (Jamiyat) - The Leadership Council formally dissolved the Afghan Interim Gov't (AIG) which was formed in March 1989. (Reported in the 6/15 issue.)

5/20 - WP - Sergei Fateev, a 24-year-old Siberian held prisoner for 5 years by the mujahideen, was handed over to Russian diplomats in Kabul. An aide to Defense Minister Masood said that more prisoners could be released, but he hinted that Afghanistan would expect some reciprocal gestures from Moscow.

5/24 - LA Daily News - Abdul Rashid Dostum was made a full general in the new Gov't.

Announcing the promotion on state-run television, President Sibghatullah Mojaddidi called Abdul Rashid Dostum, who abandoned Najibullah only recently, "a great Islamic warrior" who helped end 14 years of communist rule. Dostum was made a full general under the new rebel-led regime.

Mojaddidi also promoted several officers under Dostum, one of several generals in Najibullah's former army who is allied with Masood. Hekmatyar is allied with members of the former defense and interior ministries.



Shahadat 5/26 ..

Frontier Post 5/25



5/26 - NYT - Gulbuddin & Masood held a 7-hour meeting at Gulbuddin's base east of Kabul. The two leaders agreed to stop fighting & to hold elections in 6 months. They also called for the withdrawal of all militia forces from Kabul. Gen. Doesam was not available for comment (see 5/30).



Frontier Post 6/1

5/30 - The Economist, commenting on the agreement, said that "having a presidential election in 6 months sounded like wild optimism, if the voting is to mean anything...Mr Mujaddidi is against an early poll. ...Afghanistan is, if anything, more divided than it was under Mr Najibullah. The emergence of 3 strong men, with more in the wings, may be a reflection of the way the country is going." (See p. 18)

- KT - Some of the Acting Ministers in the Mojaddidi Gov't: Finance - Wakil Shabaz; Commerce - Hamidullah Rahimi; Light Industries & Food-stuffs - Haji Sulaiman Yari; Planning - Sayed Mah'd Ali Jawad; Education - Abdul Qayum; Foreign Affairs - Sayed Sulaiman Cailani; State Min. for Foreign Affairs - Moh'd Sidiq Saljuki; Deputy Foreign Minister - Jalil Shams; &, of course, Defense - Ahmad Shah Masoud.

- Newsday - A plane carrying Mojaddidi & 69 others returning from a 3-day visit to Pakistan was hit by a rocket at Kabul airport.

5/31 - LA Daily News - Mojaddidi's family accused Hekmatyar's forces of firing on the president's aircraft. Other members of the Gov't don't dispute the claim but say they doubt that Gulbuddin ordered

## BOOK REVIEWS

UNTYING THE AFGHAN KNOT: NEGOTIATING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, Riaz M. Khan; An Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1991. 402 pp., maps, index.

AFGHANISTAN'S GORDIAN KNOT: AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CONFLICT AND STRATEGIES FOR PEACE, Hafizullah Emadi; Occasional Paper 3 of the International Relations Program. Honolulu: East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, 1991. 36 pp., tables, maps.

"I have rubbed down my fingernails pulling at this knot," lamented the Urdu poet Ghalib, referring to the pain caused by his beloved. Both of these authors have tugged at the knot of Afghanistan, one in a short essay (which was preceded by a book) and one in 9 years of negotiations for the Pakistan Foreign Ministry and the present lengthy book.

Riaz Moh'd Khan, formerly the Director General for Afghanistan Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan, was the only diplomat on any team who participated in the entire process of negotiating the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan from the first hints in 1981 to their signing on April 14, 1988. This book consists of an extremely detailed account of those negotiations from the point of view of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry, together with an attempt to situate the diplomatic developments in a local, regional and world context.

The result is a book that is more designed for consultation than reading, except for the sort of Afghanomaniacs who actually read book reviews in the Afghanistan Forum. The book is really a detailed memoir; it offers interesting insights into the thinking of the government of Pakistan and in particular into the intra-governmental battles. As far as I know, this book contains the first confirmation from an official source of the divergence of views between the Foreign Office of Pakistan and the ISI. Riaz M. Khan offers an interesting - and, in view of his continuing government service as Ambassador to Kazakhstan, rather daring - account of the development of this conflict. He is also quite interesting in the political infighting that developed between Gen. Zia and the Junejo Government over the signing of the accords and other matters in 1988. In fact, his revelations clarify a whole list of puzzles of interest mainly to those who followed these negotiations closely.

He is less satisfying on the bigger issues - we are not privy to the direct US-Soviet negotiations, to the domestic changes in the USSR (except as summarized from news-paper reports), nor, on the other hand, to the construction of grass-roots resistance organizations inside Afghanistan. Riaz Khan refers to both these aspects of the developments and takes the balanced view that military pressure and diplomatic negotiations played complementary roles in giving the Soviets both the motive and the opportunity to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan.

The events that have transpired since the beginning of this year, with the collapse of Najibullah and the failure of the UN's efforts to promote a negotiated internal settlement, pose a bigger question, however. Maybe the Soviet Union got out of Afghanistan because it was in the throes of a domestic transformation vaster than anyone imagined at the time, in which the loss of some helicopters in Paktia or the development of clever bits of wording by Mr. Cordovez played equally marginal roles. By 1988, the Soviets had no more interest in being in Afghanistan; by the end of 1991, they had no more interest in being Soviet, and the orphaned Kabul regime fell apart 100 days later. It is not a pleasant thought for those of us who hope for reasoned solutions to knotty problems to consider whether uncontrollable and often violent social conflicts develop independently of any actor's wishes, but the reality forces these questions on us.

Hafizullah Emadi focuses on the relations of domestic and international forces in Afghanistan and the obstacles to what he saw as a reasonable solution in late 1991, when the USSR still existed. The pamphlet is largely a highly condensed version of his previous book (State, Revolution and Superpowers in Afghanistan (New York: Praeger, 1990)) with a short section at the end on reconstruction, summarized from works by others. What is interesting about the pamphlet is the author's unusual viewpoint. He gives an inordinate amount of attention to the "Maoist" (or, as he calls them, "revolutionary,") groups, which he claims "have no regular military bases [but] are active throughout the country." (p. 12.) The author also claims that "possibly as many as 24 percent" of Afghans are Shi'a (p. 2), which is consistent with claims made by the Iranian-based parties but not with the table he reprints from Canfield on p. 32, which shows about 15% of the population to be Shi'a. There are other gaffes: no doubt Sheikh Sayyaf (as the Riyadh taxi drivers call him) would be surprised to find himself on a list of "moderates" with Mujaddidi and Gailani on p. 13. (In fairness, such errors are sometimes due to editors or printers, but even so the author should have been a more attentive proofreader.) Nonetheless, the pamphlet is interesting for presenting some detailed information on the leftist and Shi'a groups which is usually lacking in Western accounts. The Shi'a parties, in particular, have shown themselves to be more powerful than most analysts seem to have realized; we need to learn more about them.

What these books have in common with much analysis of Afghanistan is an underestimation of the depth of the crisis. The knot that may come undone is not, alas, the conflict in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan itself. Despite all the worn fingernails of the people of Afghanistan, diplomats, and well-intentioned analysts (I humbly include myself in the latter group), peace has not come to Afghanistan - knot yet, and perhaps knot ever.

Barnett R. Rubin  
Columbia University

---

THE BEAR TRAP. By Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin. Leo Cooper; 243 pages; £18.50

THE war was run by Pakistan, paid for half and half by America and Saudi Arabia, fought by Afghans—and it beat the Russians. Yet the only winners, write Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and his collaborator, Mark Adkin, were the Americans. They were revenged for their humiliation in Vietnam while preventing a fundamentalist Muslim regime from replacing the communist government in Kabul.

The brigadier could be wrong in assuming that the fundamentalists are forever blocked from power. But on the running of the war he knows what he is talking about: he did it himself for four years from 1983-87. As head of the Afghan Bureau of the Inter-Services Intelligence (isi)—Pakistan's equivalent of the CIA—he was in effect the mujahideen's commander-in-chief. It was all done in secret; most senior Pakistani officers, he says, had no idea what was going on. He saw to the guerrillas' training, the distribution of weapons, the planning of operations and even their carrying out. Pakistani isi teams regularly entered Afghanistan alongside the guerrillas.

As a professional infantryman, he looks down his nose at politicians, statesmen and

spies. The CIA, he writes, showed an infuriating inability to grasp the basic elements of guerrilla warfare. But he admired the late Bill Casey, who ran the CIA in the mid-1980s, and who at planning sessions with his Pakistani counterpart, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman Khan, would yell, "To hell with politicians, we're fighting a war."

It was the politicians, nevertheless, who had the last say. Brigadier Yousaf's war of attrition succeeded brilliantly. But the tide of war began to turn in the mujahideen's favour, the Americans, says the brigadier, began to look at Afghanistan without a Soviet army, and what they saw alarmed them: they saw an Islamic fundamentalist regime with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar establishing a religious dictatorship similar to Iran's.

The tone changed. Attempts to take the war into the Soviet Union were discouraged. The Pakistanis, planning cross-border raids into Soviet Central Asia, requested copies of the Koran (for distribution) and large maps (for military purposes). The Korans were supplied, but not the maps. And, in 1987, both the brigadier and his boss, General Akhtar, were got rid of. The general was kicked upstairs by President Zia. The brigadier, denied pro-

motion, retired from the army. Next year, Zia himself was killed in an aeroplane crash.

The guerrillas might have won an outright victory if they had gone straight for Kabul after the last Russian soldier left in February 1989. But by then the Russians and the Americans shared a common aim in preventing a fundamentalist victory. They both wanted a stalemate. The Russians beefed up the Afghan army. The Americans cut the guerrillas' supplies and played on the rivalry of their leaders, encouraging a dissension that needed very little encouragement.

Brigadier Yousaf writes bitterly of the politics—and the military disasters—that cost his men their victory. His views are one-dimensional. But as a first-hand account of an extraordinary, largely secret, guerrilla campaign, his book is full of rich detail.

THE BEAR TRAP. £18.50



# THE KABUL TIMES

ESTABLISHED 1982

NO. 27 VOL. XXX

THURSDAY MAY 14, 1992, SAUR 24, 1371 H.S.

PUBLISHED BY ALBERUNI PUBLISHING HOUSE

**The staff of the Alberuni Publishing House congratulate the Afghan nation, the Leading Council and the Jehadi Council on the victory of the Islamic Jehad, wishing them further success in their efforts for promotion of the Islamic school of life and reconstruction of Afghanistan.**



Esteemed Professor Habibullah Mujaaddidi, Chairman of the Jehadi Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.



Esteemed Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, Chairman of the Leadership Council of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

## Congratulatory messages

On the Occasion of the formation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the nomination of the appointment of His Excellency Professor Habibullah Mujaaddidi as the Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, congratulatory messages have been received from some cultural and educational institutions, State organs and special agencies.

In the messages, progress and prosperity of Afghanistan has been wished for under the leadership of Honourable Professor Habibullah Mujaaddidi. The messages have also wished further success for the Jehadi Council and the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the messages have expressed unconditional support to the new Islamic country.

## Hazrat Sahib arrives in Kabul

The Islamic State of Afghanistan under the leadership of Esteemed Prof. Habibullah Mujaaddidi Chairman of the Jehadi Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan arrived safely in Kabul on April 26th. The BIA correspondent reported that at the members of the Jehadi Council escorted by a caravan of vehicles

carrying the Hazrat Sahib arrived in the beautiful and ancient city of Kabul at around 10 am. Thousands of noble Muslim and pious citizens of Kabul including men, women, youth and children had gathered on the streets according to a housing and a formal welcome to the members of the Jehadi Council. (On page 2)

## Leadership Council meet

The first session of the leadership council was called on May 6, presided over by its chairman, esteemed Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and attended by esteemed Professor Habibullah Mujaaddidi, Maulavi Mohammad Ayatullah-ul-Osmani, Mohammad Aref Muhamadi, Engineer Ahmad Shah and Hajji Abdul Geyou on behalf of their fansies.

Talking to a BIA correspondent, esteemed Muhamadi, Secretary and Spokesman of the Council gave the details of its decisions. (On page 14p)

## Islamic State takes over in Kabul

Honourable prof. Habibullah Mujaaddidi chairman of the Islamic Jehadi Council of Afghanistan and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and other members of the Jehadi Council were also present attended a special function held on April 26 at around 10 am. In the function the state of affairs of Afghanistan were delegated from the former regime to the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

At the outset of the function, some verses from the Holy Quran were recited and then Abdul Wahid Marani Vice President of the former regime making a speech formally delegated the state

of affair of the country to honourable, prof. Habibullah Mujaaddidi chairman of the Islamic Jehadi Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

Afterwards, the prime minister of the former regime Faizullah Khalilzad, Haji Ahmad Abasi chairman of the House of Representatives, Mahmud Karim Shah, Chief Justice of the former regime made brief speeches and congratulated the delegation of the state of affairs to the Islamic State of Afghanistan and pledged cooperation with the latter. (On page 4)



View of ceremonies for delegation of power

## Esteemed Mujaddidi receives foreign ambassadors

Chairman of the Interim Islamic Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

Maulavi Mujaaddidi received foreign countries' ambassadors, chargé d'affaires and diplomatic missions

(On page 3)



Meeting diplomatic representatives in Kabul.

## Recognition of Islamic State of Afghanistan

Quoting reports from Islamic, international news agencies have repre-

ted that Pakistan was the first nation which accorded formal recogni-

tion to the government. A spokesman for the foreign ministry of Pakistan

has said that relations would begin with this government. (On page 2)

# The sacred war. peak of honor

The Afghan nation traversing a stream of blood, finally ascended to the peak of honor. The Islamic revolution typified by its massive tribute came to the front and the Islamic State was established.

This was the first time that world noticed a true revolutionary Islamic system grafted in a country where all colonial power of remote past and the contemporary war-maintains would have much liked to see paralysed in permanent disorder, tearing a part another.

The revolution has not been an isolated isolated advent or a big power manipulation made-out of power politics. But it takes its deep roots from the wills of the people and thus it is staunchly preserved by millions of Afghans unhesitatingly. The Afghans truly found out their natural way of life which is inseparably tied up with Islamic values. The Islamic state bears no enmity towards any form on individual, any country or group of countries, it only desire to impair what the destructions and scour of wounds inherited from the past communist totalitarianism and to rebuild the fiscal of society over which the soft warlords and administration conserves much railed to rule.

Domestically the new state is in pursuit of preserving the security and tranquility of the country through the normalization of the general situation and would never put a seal of reiteration on any recourse to private or mass terrorization of segments of people and would not allow such acts.

Domestically the staffs considers as a priority the rebuilding of the nation and would achieve the expansion extended by foreign states.

The state is widely considering a concrete basis line of policies in full conformity with the Islamic principles. We are strongly hopeful that at the world look on the present situation preserved exactly as it goes, and could reset deservedly to the ground being expressed by the new Islamic revolutionary state.

(From page 1)

city security commission including esteemed Dr. Abdul Rahman, vice-chairman of the supervisory commission, Dr. Majidullah Mujaddidi and esteemed Sayed Madiqul.

Later, esteemed Prof. Sabghatullah Mujaddidi Chairman of the Jihadi Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan took part in the first session of the Islamic Jihadi Council of Afghanistan. Began with the recitation of verses from the Holy Quran by esteemed Sayed Mawlawi Sayed Mohammad, member of the Jihadi Council heard a report of the Kabul security commission and dis-

cussed the current situation in the country.

Answering another question the BIA correspondent, esteemed Prof. Hazrat Sabghatullah Mujaddidi Chairman of the Jihadi Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan expressed happiness for his arrival in Kabul city after a decade of immigration.

"My return to Kabul, this ancient capital of our dear country renews the sentiment of a honest and sincere son who returns to his kind mother.

Hazrat Mujaddidi delivering a speech welcoming H.E. Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister of Pakistan

Retired Professor Sabghatullah Mujaddidi meeting His Excellency Benon Sevan

Retired Professor Sabghatullah Mujaddidi, Chairman of the Jihadi Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan met on May 4 His Excellency Benon Sevan, Deputy and Special Envoy of the US Secretary General in Gulhane Palace, reported BIA correspondent.

## Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif arrives in Kabul

Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, His Excellency Nawaz Sharif arrived in Kabul on April 29, heading a top-level delegation on an official and friendly visit.

At the Kabul airport, esteemed Hazrat Sabghatullah Mujaddidi, head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, ambassador, chargé d'affaires and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries in Kabul, including Sayed Peda Yumna, Charge d'affaires of the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan received Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his entourage.

After His Excellency Nawaz Sharif and his accompanying delegation inspected the guard of honor, esteemed Professor Sabghatullah Mujaddidi welcomed him.

This senior delegation included Prince Taraki Al-Jaisi, Asif Mehmud, Chief of Staff, Sidiq Kanju, State Minister for External Affairs, Abdul Sattar Lale, Minister of Information, Abdul Sattar Mezai, Minister of Religious Affairs and Trusts and Jawed Nasar, General Director of the DSI of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

### Reports heard

A meeting of the Jihadi council was called on May 7, presided over by Hazrat Sabghatullah Mujaddidi, head of the Jihadi council and representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan at the Gulhane palace.

After recitation of few verses from the Holy Quran, reports of the acting ministers of finance, industries and light industries, water and power, finance, acting attorney general and acting Kabul mayor were heard by the participants and decisions were adopted thereupon.

As regards maintaining law and order in Kabul city, stress was laid on tightening the security in the city.

The meeting was also attended by the representatives of Hazrat Islamic party of Afghanistan.

the Afghans, we are all Afghans and the sons of the united Afghanistan.

All must join hands from this very moment to ensure security and stability throughout the country. We must jointly act for preservation of the honours, peaceful and safe life of all the subjects of united Afghanistan.

In the first place, we should thank God, the almighty, that we could establish for the first time a real Islamic State in our dear country. The time has come now that the Afghans should join hands for ensuring security and stability, national unity and solidarity among

Twenty members of the Jihadi Council accompanied esteemed Prof. Hazrat Sabghatullah Mujaddidi to Kabul. Other members of the Council shall reach Kabul soon, the BIA reports. (BIA)

## Hazrat Mujaddidi receives Kunar elders

The representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Hazrat Sabghatullah Mujaddidi in his meeting with the Kunar elders.

Honorable prof. Hazrat Sabghatullah Mujaddidi chairman of the Jihadi Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan received a jirga of the elders, Ulama and spiritual dignitaries of Kunar province at the Gulhane palace on May 5.

At the outset, some verses from the holy Quran were recited. Then representing the audience, lawyer Abdul Shah Sadi and a number of the participants welcomed the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the appointment of His Excellency Hazrat Sabghatullah Mujaddidi as the head of the Jihadi Council and Representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. They also applauded the firm strides taken by the government towards prosperity of the Afghan people and normalization of the situation in the country during the last few days, pledging their all round preparedness for reorganization of Kunar Province and their cooperation with the Islamic State.

Congratulating the victory of the Islamic Revolution to the Afghans and the Kunar people, prof. Hazrat Sabghatullah Mujaddidi appreciated the sense of devotion and all sided-collaboration of the people of Kunar in the success of the Islamic Jihadi in Afghanistan.

(On page 2)





## Prices decline in Kabul

With the formation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the prices of essential goods in the city bazaars and all the grain markets have registered a declining trend. Thus our pious and muslim countrymen shall no more have to worry about prices hikes more as the State of Afghanistan for the fact that the Firstly, Consolidation of security in Kabul

and other provinces of has been undertaken by greatly to the decline of foodstuffs prices the country, secondly air and land, of which of foodstuffs prices the Kabul citizens are in the country. The Islamic Republic of Iran has reduced the price of essential goods. The official visit of His Excellency the prime minister of the State of Afghanistan and its transportation has already begun by air.

The urgent relief assistance promised by the delegation of the neighbouring countries country to Kabul and cheque for Rs.250 million by him and the dispatch of 50,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan have contributed quite

5/26 (KT)

## More assistance to Kabul

With the establishment of the Islamic State in Afghanistan the prices of the essential goods have declined before the arrival of the 51-member Jihadi council. The VOA has reported that the price of 98kg flour was Afz.45000 and it has now fallen to Afz.10,000 only. Moreover the interim government

paid the salaries of the government officials and distributed the coupon materials, reported from the VOA.

The VOA has reported that lorries carry primary goods to 275,000 desert-cloths and catties from Pakistan to Kabul.

Another report says that 10,000,000 and 15,000 tons of wheat from the US

assistance will be sent to Kabul, Herat and other regions of the country respectively. 800,000 Dollar worth foodstuffs including sugar, tea and cereals are ready to be carried from Peshawar. In addition to that 500,000 Dollars worth medicines and medical

5/26 SIA



Ayatullah Mohammad Asef Muhseni talking with the people's representatives from Ghazni and Surkhe Parsh

5/26

Ayatullah Mohammad Asef Muhseni, Leader of the Islamic Movement Party of Afghanistan and spokesman of the Leadership Council of the Islamic State of Afghanistan had a meeting with

some elders, chieftains of Afshar, Darul-Aman, Paghman district of Kabul, inhabitants of Leling district of Parwan province and a number of employees of Ariana Afghan Airlines Company on May 18.



36

TUESDAY MAY 26, 1992

## Too Little to whisper about

With the first break of the morning light of Islamic triumph in Afghanistan much is being heard about some unmodelled re-adjustments of affairs.

Some of the whispers are not confined in derogatory rumors in certain quarters only but sinister tries are made to give them national or international vibrations in order to tarnish or at least blur the picture of Islam as a self-reliant socio-political system. However, the most ear-catching among all such utterances; after the silencing of the guns and abiding the market with foodstuffs and other essential and prime commodities, is the threatening problem that were hanging over our life earlier; is that the new State had some hesitations in announcing basic policy lines while the previous souborn regimes would manage to set those systems of guidance in no later than a week's time.

Nonetheless, it must be said that what they called the past revolutions were nothing but pre-planned coups cladded with pre-written and prescribed policy lines while the Islamic Revolution is a thunder-blazed flood of a completely new system of values, a definition of man in his relation with his Creator, the sternity and his re-birth; it is the Islamic system over which shines the Quranic belief that "God is the light of the Universe".

Further, in some western political quarters even worse than the above-mentioned whispers, they wrongly think that the present Islamic tide of what they call a "Religious Renaissance", is similar to the "Babylon Revolution" of eastern Europe which was set-tricked and set a debacle. It is, they know, the submergence of the government of belief and ethics instead of the western-type pragmatism and man-made law, dominium.

This is exactly the definition of what they call "Islamic Fundamentalism" and is exactly what they much feared and tried to prevent even under the blue flag. This is because they knew that no more the Quranic decrees are being weighed up with western doctrines and applied only then.

Fortunately, these local and western quarters have too little to whisper about. Particularly, if the new peace plan with Eng. Hekmatyar is to materialize in near future. It is hoped that they may also lose their grounds for propaganda campaign if the Islamic State brings about a re-arrangement of affairs now, when the whirlwind of the flood is gradually receding.

(M. Rahim Rafat).

the attack.

Airport officials said a rocket crashed into the runway as the president's aircraft landed, sending shrapnel flying through the cockpit window and injuring the co-pilot. Investigators also reported a burst of anti-aircraft artillery fire that apparently sheared off the plane's nose. . . .



6/1 - AFGHANews - Ariana Afghan Airlines resumed flights to Tehran on 5/13 after a 14-year gap. There will be a weekly flight on Thursdays. Ariana also has weekly flights between Kabul & Peshawar - \$80 each way.

- The Leadership Council of Afghanistan dissolved the Watan Party on 5/6, as well as the old cabinet, senate, nat'l assembly & the secret police, according to Shaikh Asef Mohseni, the Council spokesman.

6/4 - NYT - Fighting between the Islamic Gov't & the Iran-backed Hezb-i-Wahdat & pro-Saudi Ittehad-i-Islami intensified. At least 200 people were taken hostage; 21 have been killed & scores wounded in the past two days. (See p.21 )

6/5 - UN Press Briefing - Benon Sevan said the UN Sec'y Gen'l was making an appeal for \$180m for emergency humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan - for food, health (including water & sanitation), mine clearance & repatriation as well as for agriculture & education. Sevan said Najibullah was still in Kabul; that he (Sevan) felt that the UN role had been a positive one as the transfer of power was relatively peaceful. He said the fact that one faction created a problem was not the fault of the UN. What happens next is up to the Afghans.

6/7 - NYT - Hundreds of Uzbek fighters from the northern militia arrived in Kabul to help the Islamic Gov't enforce a cease-fire.



Frontier Post 6/7

6/15 - NYT - A US delegation, headed by Peter Tomsen, arrived in Kabul to discuss diplomatic matters with the new Gov't. One topic was the reopening of the US Embassy in Kabul. "When will depend on security," Tomsen said. (See 6/23)

- AFGHANews - Over 35 countries, including Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, the EEC countries & the US have recognized the Islamic Gov't of Afghanistan.

- The Sudan donated 150 tons of sugar to Afghanistan.

- The US Gov't will provide funds for the repair of the Torkham-Kabul highway. The work, to be completed by October, is being done by the Afghan Construction & Logistical Organization, an Afghan NGO based in Peshawar.

6/16 - Asbury Park Press - Pakistan's Pres. Ghulam Ishaq Khan met with Afghanistan's leaders yesterday & urged them to stop feuding. "Pakistan wants to see a consolidation of peace in Afghanistan thru political process & dialogue," he said.

6/17 - WP - Mojaddidi offered "places" to an ethnic Hazara group - the Unity Party & to Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostam. The WP indicated that these moves might imperil the caretaker Gov't.

6/22 - Newsday - Mojadidi said yesterday that he wanted to transfer power to a 64-person Jihad Council which he heads.

6/22 - WSJ - A former Afghan president was killed in a plane crash near Kabul that also killed a militia commander, Pakistan's news agency reported. Babrak Karmal, 63, who became president after the Soviets intervened in late 1979, was traveling with Gen. Rasheed Dostum, head of the Uzbek militia.

6/23 - WSJ - An Uzbek militia leader said he will remain neutral in the struggle for power within Afghanistan's new Islamic government. Gen. Dostum spoke to reporters in Kabul by radio-telephone to dispel Pakistani reports that he was killed in a plane crash.

- NYT - The US is helping Russia & other former Soviet republics trace & identify 30 - 50 war prisoners held in Afghanistan, mostly from Russia & the Ukraine.

American officials monitoring Kabul, where a collection of a dozen or more former rebel groups are jockeying for power, say security there seems to be improving slightly in at least some neighborhoods.

The practice called "happy firing," shooting into the air before and after evening prayers, has been curtailed, they say.

Washington, while observing events in Kabul to determine at what point the United States can safely reopen an embassy, has also been helping the Afghan interim leadership find about 500 children taken to the Soviet Union in the 1980's by the K.G.B. or the Soviet military.

Moscow has said the children were orphans. Afghans said the children had been rounded up, often snatched from their families, and taken away, apparently to be indoctrinated and perhaps returned to support the Najibullah Government. President Najibullah's Government collapsed in April.

6/29 - NYT - Mojadedi stepped down yesterday, peacefully transferring power to Burhanuddin Rabbani, the 53-year-old leader of Jamiat-i-Islami. Rabbani promised unity: "We won't take a step without consensus," he said. Gulbuddin announced that his deputy, Ustad Fareed, would become Prime Minister within a week. (See 7/7)



7/3 - WP - Interim Gov't troops are trying to establish their authority by evicting hundreds of heavily armed former guerrillas from Kabul. Since the Islamic caretaker Gov't was established in Kabul, over 1,400 people have been killed or wounded in factional fighting.

7/4 - LAT - The security sweep continued:

"Getting rid of these men was our hope and our demand," said Haji Zahir Gul, a Kabul resident. "Now there will be no more looting."

Afghan rebel forces captured Kabul on April 25 after a lengthy civil war. Since then, a motley band of rival guerrilla groups and former government militia forces has terrorized residents.

Street fighting, robbery, kidnapping and murder have become commonplace.

Few shots were fired, and there were no reports of casualties as

7/5 - WP - About 50 people were killed in Kabul yesterday & Rabbani narrowly escaped injury as guerrillas south of the city traded rocket fire with defending Gov't troops.

A rocket fell about 100 yards from the room in the presidential palace where Rabbani was holding a meeting, killing one bodyguard and injuring two others. About 300 people in the Afghan capital were injured in the bombardment.

The fighting was between the

forces of radical Muslim guerrilla chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, massed to the south of Kabul, and the forces of Gen. Rasheed Dostum, garrisoned inside the capital at the ancient fortress of Bala Hissar. Each side blamed the other for firing first.



Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani

7/7 - WSJ - "Renegade guerrillas" accompanied Afghanistan's new Prime Minister, Ustad Abdul Saboor Farid, into Kabul, ending a 2-month Hezb-i-Islami boycott of the caretaker Islamic Gov't.

جنه خدا اي کوي  
حق به و شني خو  
د اخري پيش چونه  
پنهان و تر

Trust in God,  
but tie  
your camel.

## HOLY WAR WITHOUT END by Mark Bauman & Markos Kounalakis

JALUDEEN HAQQANI, THE CHIEF OF the Mujahedeen Command Council, sits barefoot on a small pillow at his palatial headquarters in the Pakistani border town of Miram Shah, one of the strategic strongholds of the Islamic forces waging holy war in Afghanistan. During the half hour he has allotted for this meeting with foreign journalists, Haqqani's intense brown eyes dart quickly from field phone to fax machine to a large floor-sized map of Afghanistan, which his commanders say he paces, barefoot, when planning a battle.

Next to him, a tall, sullen-faced bodyguard fingers the leather on a beautifully tooled gun holster. It is fastened at the waist by the hammer and sickle of a Soviet army belt buckle, a poignant reminder that in the latter half of the 20th Century, the arrogance of white civilizers has been seriously denied by natives armed with a more overarching faith in religion, house and home.

Dozens of men, many of them lost in prayer, wait outside Haqqani's office, and in the course of the interview, almost 20 stream in, directed by an aide, asking for orders, advice or supplies. The armies that defeated the Soviets in a devastating 10-year war sprang from tribes led by men such as Haqqani, who serve not only as civil and military leaders, but also as religious elders. Having just returned to his office from leading prayers outside, Haqqani settles a dispute between two commanders over who gets the larger share of some supplies that have just come in from the Pakistani government. He is arbiter of the law here, and his word is rarely challenged.

Haqqani is a fundamentalist religious scholar and the son of an old tribal leader, representing both the shape of Afghanistan's future and the power of its past. For more than a decade now, he and the top commanders of the Mujahedeen Command Council, a loose grouping of the most powerful military figures in the opposition, have combined the strength of their culture with modern ordnance as a rebuke to those who have tried to remake Afghanistan in their own image. It is a melding that remains in place as Western resources are officially withdrawn from a country the West has armed to the teeth and continues, indirectly, to fund. After two centuries of less than satisfactory experiments with imported ideologies, Afghanistan, like much of the Third World, is trying to find a path that is more in line with its own traditions.

Haqqani speaks with the assurance of a man who has seen the tides of history shift in his favor. "Twenty years ago our people were Marxists, Leninists, Capitalists," he spits out, dismissing each "ism" with equal contempt. "Now they fight the holy war. They have changed."

Since the troops of the former Soviet Union completed their withdrawal in February, 1989, hundreds of Muslims from around the world have come to this dusty base camp in Miram Shah, just across the Pakistani border from Haqqani's home province of Paktia, to participate in the first big modern victory of the holy war. Success seemed far from certain in 1979, when Babrak Karmal was flown in a Soviet plane from exile in Eastern Europe to Kabul and, with the support of 80,000 Soviet combat troops, installed as president of Afghanistan. The war that would claim 1½ million Afghan lives began. Ten years later, an angry and alienated Soviet military limped home, leaving behind the

current president, Najibullah, thousands of military and technical advisers and a political vacuum that the Islamic powers moved quickly to fill.



Today the *mujahedeen* ("holy warriors") control most of the Afghan countryside, and the various tribes, groups and sects within them once again find themselves battling each other with the same ferocity that they direct at the current regime. "The problem," says Abdul Haq, commander of the Kabul region and another member of the command council, "is that the Soviets destroyed parts of the traditional fabric of Afghan society. The country has been invaded many times before. And always in the past, the religious leaders would call for jihad ("holy war"); the tribal leaders would provide the resources, and the people would fight." But in trying to create an egalitarian society, the communists broke down those distinctions and left nothing in their place. In many areas, they installed secular leaders who, backed only by Soviet troops, had little or no legitimacy.

"During the early years of the war," says Haq, "when we were fighting in the mountains, the CIA and Pakistan funded the fundamentalists because they figured that those groups were least likely to compromise with the regime. The problem is that the fundamentalists are now much stronger than the democrats. And they don't compromise, period."

Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, China and Pakistan further complicate the picture. Now fighting to be the pre-eminent political power in the region, they have stepped up their funding for the jihad. Material support is appreciated, but the attempts of foreign Muslims to define the political agenda of various *mujahedeen* groups is not. In the mountains of central Afghanistan, Iran funds a Pushkin tribe of Maoist Shiite fundamentalists. But they are too independent, so Tehran has also set up Afghan units based on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. In northern Afghanistan, China funds Tajik tribes of Sunnis fundamentalists. In Kunar province, Arab fundamentalists funded by various Saudi clerics now spend more of their time battling their former Afghan allies than they do fighting the regime of Najibullah.

Even among the various Afghan opposition groups, skirmishes have become a regular thing. One American aid worker, who uses trained dogs to help the *mujahedeen* find Soviet mines buried in their territory, complains that many groups reuse the devices against other commanders who are supposed to be their allies. Many of the tribes in central Afghanistan switch allegiances, in the blink of an eye, between the regime and various opposition groups depending on who has the most money, who is trying to take control of their territory, and who appears to be winning the war at the moment.

In April, 1991, under Haqqani's tutelage, various commanders cooperated successfully for months in order to capture Khowst, near the Pakistani border. But as soon as the regime troops surrendered, according to men involved in the battle, various *mujahedeen* groups began fighting among themselves over the spoils of the city. Today, everyone wants to be the one to take Kabul, and win the war. And everyone knows, too, that only a cooperative effort unique in Afghanistan's history will finally bring an end to the fighting that has killed one in 10 Afghans and created the world's largest refugee population—more than 5 million Afghans live in Pakistani and Iranian refugee camps without sufficient food or medical care.

Beyond the big tents and post-fenced compounds that surround the Afghan political elite in Peshawar or Miram Shah, the camps extend for miles in a Pakistani desert considered uninhabitable just 10 years ago. There are Tajik camps, Pushkin camps, camps for Sunnis and Shiite Muslims. There are widows' camps, orphans' camps and hundreds of cemeteries that seem to stretch from Pakistan all the way to the edge of the Afghan horizon. The women and young children who compose the bulk of the refugee population have no political voice, but they do have one thing in common: They want to go home. • • •

Throughout the war, both the United States and Saudi Arabia annually provided \$300 million to \$500 million in military and humanitarian aid. Although Saudi Arabia is now being pressured to agree to a military aid cut forged by Washington and Moscow—the U.S. cutoff date was Jan. 1—private donations from sheiks and clerics throughout the Muslim world have nearly filled the gap. Haqqani, for example, already receives almost 80% of his funding through representative offices in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, immediately after the Gulf War, the Saudis provided the *mujahedeen* with 300 captured Iraqi tanks (although many did not work). And Saudi Arabia's intelligence chief, Turki bin Faisal, recently summoned the *mujahedeen* leaders in Pakistan for a meeting with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to discuss ways to compensate for the end of U.S. aid.

At the behest of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United States, several of the Pakistan-based political powers have also tried to begin direct negotiations in Moscow, but the men who control the Afghan councils say these political leaders do not speak for them. The commanders have been running large parts of the country for years, says Haqqani, and they will be the basis for any future Islamic government.

Many foreign observers concur. "The problem," says one American diplomat, "is that even though the international community continues to deal with the politicians in Pakistan and Iran, these men have no real power on the ground. The death of communism in Russia left Najibullah with just a few corrupt militias and enough air support to delay defeat. The commanders control most of the armed population of Afghanistan; they are the ones who are going to have to take Kabul. It's going to be tough to convince them to give it back."

AS YOU ENTER AFGHANISTAN'S BADLY FACTIONALIZED interior from the rebel base in Miran Shah, you hear what sounds like the distant tap of a carpenter's hammer: light machine-guns fire from several training camps near Khowst. Hundreds of new-wheel-drive Toyota trucks, purchased by patrons in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Washington, carefully thread their way through a never-ending maze of mine-saturated hills, dry stream beds and roadways pockmarked by charred craters deep enough to swallow a man. A few miles farther into the countryside begins the heavy percussion of the big guns shelling Gardez, Najibullah's birthplace.

After years of constant war, the guerrillas here seem almost bored as they continue their siege of the city just a quarter mile below. Many of them wear Soviet army uniforms taken from captured government stores, prisoners or the dead. The refuse of what is perhaps the last superpower proxy war lies everywhere: Charred and rusting Soviet tanks, armored vehicles and helicopters dot the arid valleys between Gardez and Khowst. Jagged shell fragments stamped with Russian, English, Arabic and French litter the countryside. The graffiti on one severed tank turret reads, "We will be victorious, God willing." But on rare moments, even as the deafening roar of modern artillery echoes through the hills, the old Afghanistan magically surfaces.

Bearded men in mountainous white turbans—their mouths packed with tobacco or dried Saudi dates—strroll hand-in-hand through the streets, their elaborately decorated side-arms encased in flowered chintz or fine leather holsters. After centuries of invasion, the fiercely tribal Pushtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen who compose Afghan society move easily from their farms, goats and fat-tailed sheep to the cold and efficient machinery of modern war.

"Allah Akbar"—"Glory be to Allah"—a young rebel dressed in modern fatigues yells perfusorily as he sends a shoulder-launched, rocket-propelled grenade toward the tank emplacements that surround Gardez. Nearby, his commander, Habib Gul, shakes his head and smiles, then polishes off a cup of Afghan green tea. Gul is a bear of a man who began the war as a member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, or government party, and later received counter-insurgency training in Leningrad as a member of the Afghan KGB once headed by Najibullah.

According to several commanders, the intelligence he provided as a double agent for the *mujahedeen* helped them plan what was perhaps their greatest victory to date—the capture of Khowst, a strategic fortress so heavily fortified by the regime that Najibullah once promised to resign if it ever fell into opposition hands.

Gul's parents raised him to be a good Muslim. The Soviets trained him to be a great warrior—but they offered him no cause. "No one believed in anything there [in the former Soviet Union]," he recalls. "They were not communists. They were not anything. But some people came to give us lectures about Marx and Lenin. And I saw that their teachings were completely opposed to Islam. So, as soon as I came home, I used my training to establish contacts with the *mujahedeen*."

As Gul continues his tale, he motions for one over-anxious machine-gunner to keep his head down. Tracer bullets flash in a long arc from the town below, and the young guerrilla takes a bullet through the left wrist. Gul grabs him under the arm like a coach helping an injured player from the field. After a cursory examination, he announces that the wound is not serious. "*Mujahedeen*," he says with a shrug. "What can you do?"

Now in his late 30s, Gul himself continues to make secret forays into Gardez at night. But he has little patience when the soldiers under him, many of them 20 years his junior, take pointlessly, showy risks.

Gul and his young ward thread their way down the hill in a weaving stutter step that they hope will avoid both mines and mortar fire. There are explosive devices everywhere: anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines. The wounded man is placed in a green Toyota truck that acts as an ambulance and is driven to a clinic in Khowst, about six hours away. There he will join injured comrades and an even larger number of holy warriors who were cut down not by enemy fire, but by malaria, yellow fever and hepatitis. Depending on the intensity of fighting among various *mujahedeen* groups and between the *mujahedeen* and the regime, casualties range from half a dozen to more than 100 a week.

Up the hill from Gul and his men, Arab warriors begin shelling the town in earnest to avenge their wounded comrade. Many of them are Palestinians in their early teens who can barely heft the grenade launchers. Their childlike voices crack as they invoke Allah's glory after every shot. But amid the smooth innocent faces and wispy beards stands one man with the unmistakable air of experience and authority: Abu Harras, a bearded Palestinian commander with a winning smile and vivid brown eyes. He promises in impeccable English that Afghanistan is only the first step in a holy war that will eventually encompass Palestine, the United States and all of the Muslim republics of the former Soviet empire. "Soon," he says, "Islam will control the world."

Backing up that rhetoric are thousands of angry Muslims who have already received training in some of the most sophisticated weaponry that American tax dollars can buy. Mixed with the Palestinians under Haqqani's command are also several part-timers: kids from the rich oil states who have taken off a few months from school or work to fight in the jihad. One young guerrilla, from a Saudi family, promises his adolescent comrades that "after Afghanistan, the Israeli Jews will be driven into the sea. All Arab governments," he adds, "are the enemies of Allah. We must do jihad against them."

THE MASS INFLUX OF FOREIGN MUSLIMS TO AFGHANISTAN began in the mid '80s, when Abdullah Azam, a Palestinian religious scholar who had been teaching in Saudi Arabia, was sent to Pakistan on a one-year exchange. In classrooms and on shortwave radio stations, he began to preach the necessity for all Muslims to join the jihad and begin fighting himself under various *mujahedeen* commanders. In 1984, Azam was appointed educational coordinator for the Muslim World League in Peshawar, a Pakistani town where most of the Afghan opposition and millions of refugees are located. He then opened "service offices" at which Muslim volunteers from around the world could sign up, for a time there was even one in New York City.

The recruiting effort drew soldiers whose agendas vary as widely as their backgrounds. "It don't make any difference if you die in Chicago, L.A. or Atlanta," says Abu Wakas, a tall, bearded black man, a Muslim from the Midwest who befriended Abu Harras, the Palestinian commander, during the battle for Khowst. "Our American brothers sleep. They don't realize the value of Islam," he intones, sitting in my hotel room just outside of Peshawar. "There must be holy war against all those who try to take the dignity of Muslims!"

Wakas, who adopted his nom de guerre after arriving in Afghanistan, had worked as a pressman-mechanic and then as a security guard in Ohio. He wears only black, from the cotton cloth that covers his bald head to his sunglasses, shirt and billowing cotton pants. He looks like six feet of dark granite, all sinew and muscle under a thin layer of skin.

Wakas joined the jihad more than three years ago and was seriously wounded during the battle for Khowst. "I was sitting at one of our artillery posts just above the airport," he recalls. "It was outside a cave. And I was reading the Koran when the mortars started

coming in. And then I felt a bee sting on my right leg and looked down. And there was blood. So I got up slowly to walk into the cave and got hit again in the left shoulder. And it spun me around some. And then for some reason I started laughing. And everyone was laughing with me. Glory be to Allah. "He says with a smile, as he pulls open his shirt to show the scar.

To have engaged in holy war, for many devout Muslims, is the ultimate test of manhood. And this war has given all of the top commanders ample opportunity to prove their mettle and commitment. Although he refuses to discuss it, Haqqani has lost at least one brother in battle. Two of his sons, one 14 and another 11, continue to fight in artillery units in the hills above Gardez, alongside many compatriots of the same age.

Nasir Uteen Haqqani, the elder of the two, paces his father's headquarters, decked out in black Dingo boots and a new camouflage jacket like a shy and friendly refugee from the '70s. As he prepares to sit down, older retainers rush to bring pots of fresh milk tea. It is clear that even at 14, he has begun to assume some of the air of command.

In the early stages of the battle for Gardez, large numbers of regime soldiers in their early teens surrendered en masse. Most of them say they were rounded up from their villages and farms in northern Afghanistan, given three weeks of training, and then sent to the front. The rebels treat them like mascots, but the young men will eventually learn to fight.

In addition to his sons, Haqqani's younger brother, Khaleel, cruises the front lines in a captured Soviet T-72 tank, his designer sunglasses flashing in the fierce mountain light. He is his brother's personal liaison into the battle region, moving from unit to unit, issuing instructions. "Our faith in Islam is like a great sword," he tells his men. "We were always religious. But now the sword has been tempered and hardened by more than 10 years of war. We have done what America could not do with all of its money and weapons: defeat the *soviet* Soviet army. We drove them out of Afghanistan and forced their retreat from Eastern Europe."

PSYCHOLOGICALLY BRUISED BY THE COLLAPSE OF the Soviet empire, people throughout the former union are now searching for something to fill the spiritual void left by communism's death. The Kremlin's apocalyptic attempt to build a socialist paradise on earth has disillusioned a generation: Last year, Boris N. Yeltsin asked the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church to preside over his inauguration. And the young are returning to the Ukrainian Church in droves. But for much of the Muslim population of the former union, the spiritual awakening began when they were asked to participate in communism's last colonial war against the fiercely religious leaders of the Afghan *mujahedeen*.

In 1979, thousands of young men from all the republics of the Soviet Union, left in their closets the outgrown uniforms of party conformity and donned the fatigues necessary for the Christmassine invasion of Afghanistan. Abu Qaseem, an Uzbek who would soon turn 19, joined the Soviet grunts who would soon number 150,000, an invasion force made up of "the sons of workers, peasants, the proletariat—seldom the sons of engineers," according to one soldier, "and very, very seldom the sons of generals."

Qaseem is a solemn young man with the dark almond eyes, high cheekbones and full beard of many Asian Muslims. Like other Central Asian soldiers who had been denied access to both the Koran and their culture for more than half a century, he now found himself confronted with the raw power of Islam for the first time. Soviet Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmen found themselves fighting tribal cousins and occasionally even distant family members right across the border. Many refused to fight. And several hundred, like Qaseem, left their Soviet compatriots to embrace the holy war.

"When Central Asian Muslims came to Afghanistan," says Qaseem, who now fights with a Tajik unit in north ern Afghanistan, "we found our cousins and handed our guns to them. When I went to Afghanistan, I saw that the people who were fighting communism were just like us, simple Uzbeks and Tajiks. Our officers told us that Afghanistan had been invaded by the Chinese

and the Americans. But I saw that it was just a lie."

Qaseem comes from a heavily Tajik part of Uzbekistan, which borders Afghanistan on the north. And like many Afghans and Central Asians, he speaks the languages of several regional tribes. The third of eight children born to an electrician in Namangan province, Qaseem confesses that, as a student, he smoked, drank and chased women. "When I was young," he remembers, "my mother told me to be a good Muslim. But I paid no attention. In the schools, they taught us that the Soviet Union was a good country, a peace-loving country. They taught us about communism. And they told us that we were all the children of monkeys."

"Only after I began to fight the jihad did I think about who created the sky, who created the sun. And I learned that the communists did not want peace, that this was a fight between believers and non-believers."

As he speaks, Qaseem casts a quick glance at the Kalashnikov assault rifle by his side. "I study the Koran now," he says, "so I can do jihad by both pen and gun. When there is a Muslim government in Afghanistan, we will move toward Central Asia. I am ready at any time to sacrifice myself to bring Islam to my home."

It is not an empty threat. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and a precipitous decline in living standards has sparked a Muslim revival in many parts of Central Asia. There have been large demonstrations by Muslim activists throughout Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—in Tajikistan, the activists were instrumental in forcing the government to hold democratic elections.

Defectors from the Soviet army are prized among *mujahedeen* commanders. Khalid Massoud, the most powerful Tajik commander, who controls much of the northern part of the country, often appears with two Russian bodyguards.

"The names of Soviet Muslims who have joined the jihad," says Haqqani, "will one day be written in gold for their great contributions to Islam."

After the collapse of strong central authority in Moscow, Central Asia's former communist leaders quickly sought refuge in Islam. Many, after years of proclaimed atheism, now say they were secret believers all along. But Qaseem and others dismiss those sudden and very public conversions by the very men who closed hundreds of mosques as cynical political maneuvers akin to former communist Najibullah's quick discovery of Allah and Afghan nationalism after the Soviet military machine decided to flee the country.

"It is not enough for these men to say now that they are religious," says Qaseem. "It takes more than the breath of fear and a few hours for a communist to become a good Muslim."

**THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A HOLDING PATTERN** when planes approach Kabul, only a steep and rapid descent. The Aeroflot Ilyushin 76 transport jets that still fly from Tashkent, Uzbekistan's capital, punctuate their sharp final drop with the pops of hot magnesium flares they release from the fuselage's side batteries. They fire the defensive charges to distract heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles shot by the rebels. The feared American-made Stinger missiles, however, cannot be fooled, and occasionally one will streak up toward a plane's thermal exhaust and blast the unfortunate craft out of the clear, cool sky.

Approaching Kabul is as precarious as landing there. In the mountains surrounding the city, some rebels have not yet retreated for the winter from their high-altitude hideaways. Radio chatter between the flare-arming spotter in the Ilyushin's nose and the plane's tail-gunner focuses on the location of a *bandi* ("bandit") who was sighted and fired on by the same plane a day earlier. Twenty minutes from Kabul, the spotter points down and says that the *bandi* has run away. Just yesterday he was right there between that peak and those rocks."

Firing at Soviet planes is almost sport for the warrior—live skeet shooting for the Islamic fundamentalist. From the moment the tires of the Ilyushin's land-

ing gear scratch on the Tarmac, pilots are prepared to take off at a moment's notice should rebels launch another assault of the sort that has destroyed planes and blown out nearly every window at the airport's arrival terminal.

"Welcome to hell," says Pakti Hanavan, a 22-year-old medical student at Kabul University. The campus, in the center of the low, dust-brown city, remains relatively untouched by mortar fire. Afghanistan is a country Hanavan loves in a war that he hates. He is reminded of Kabul's dangers—when he is patrolled by a guard toting an AK-47 at the entrance to the medical school, when he hears automatic weapons fire in the distance or the soft booms of artillery that announce it is 10:30 p.m., the evening curfew for Kabul's ever-fluctuating population.

Across the street from the medical school, at the new International Committee of the Red Cross hospital for the war's wounded, Hanavan is confronted daily with casualties. The limbless and the maimed sit outside, turning their faces upward to catch the warmth of winter rays in a ritual that is the heliocentric equivalent of turning to Mecca.

The Red Cross does not ask patient whether they are with the regime or the *mujahedeen*. Most casualties, however, are privately proud to claim allegiance to one of the many rebel groups. The Red Cross had attempted to teach the *mujahedeen* that once they take prisoners they should neither torture nor kill them. But the Swiss organization has had to curtail its operations because this war is no longer for or against an occupier, but has become a war of political dominance. Says one Red Cross administrator: "This is the most dangerous type of situation for us." They have already closed down two first aid stations outside Kabul, and some workers have been kidnapped and killed by rebels.

If Kabul is a living hell, it is not an exclusive one. It democratically affects all—politicians, businessmen, students and workers alike. But one class of people suffer more than the rest: the several hundred remaining Russian-speakers who stayed on as advisers, spies, Scud missile technical crews and diplomats. The first secretary of what used to be the Soviet embassy may feel the danger more acutely than most, perhaps because the word at the Sikh money exchange is that he has been targeted for assassination.

"Most Afghans living in Kabul support the *mujahedeen* and all of them hate the Russians," says a man who gives his name only as Singh, a name common to all Sikh men. The endless caravans of trucks that come down the Salang Highway bringing cases of military equipment, fuel, flour, sugar and other basic goods, many of which are now rationed, are the last palpable sign that Moscow still feels obligated to Kabul (although military aid has been cut off, humanitarian aid continues). And, according to former Soviet officials, up until the end of 1991, the Kremlin continued to funnel about \$400 million a month in assistance to the Afghans. In light of continuing economic difficulties at home, however, Russian President Yeltsin has promised to cut off foreign aid to all countries in



**Caricature, which appeared in downtown Kabul recently, expresses that time is running out for ousted President Najibullah**

**The former Afghan leader is still in hiding.**

Frontier Post 5/10

the near future.

That has, of course, left Najibullah on the defensive. Though he still has a large stockpile of weapons, his eventual defeat is inevitable. Many observers, however, question whether the opposition will be able to cooperate after Najibullah is gone. "There is no question that Afghanistan is Islam's biggest victory so far," says exiled Syrian journalist Ahmad Muaffaqzadran. "And the victory will spread to other parts of the world. But Afghanistan is not a nation state. There has always been fighting among the various tribes here. And I do not think the fighting will end when there is an Islamic government in Kabul."

"The leadership we have is simply not good enough," complains Abdul Haq. "They have had 14 years to forge some kind of consensus and they have failed." Haq, whose right foot was blown off by a mine during an operation more than two years ago, hobbles around the study of his headquarters in Peshawar on a plastic prosthesis that was custom-made for him in Lansing, Mich. His walls are decorated with glossy photographs of bomb blasts in vivid orange and grays. On the coffee table lies the hard cover version of George Rosic's "International Guide to Terrorism."

Haq, like many of the more moderate commanders, is still unwilling to launch a final assault on Kabul. "The problem," says the balding commander, "is not that Najibullah is militarily strong. But that we have nothing to replace him with. So we don't want to push so hard he collapses."

"I'm not going to trade my men," he says through his thick beard, "for a government that isn't going to work."

THE HERALD, a popular Pakistani magazine, devoted about 40 pages of its May 1992 issue to the question, "Can Afghanistan Survive?" The following articles & extracts are taken from that issue:

## WILL THE CENTRE HOLD?

In the Dasti Barchi suburb of Kabul, Shias from Hazarajat, backed by Iran, have already carved out a fiefdom with its own rules and curfews. The door of every house is plastered with pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Hazaras are lukewarm to both Massoud and Hekmatyar, and defy the new government seated just a few miles up the road. They take their orders from the Iranian Ambassador in Kabul.

Around Jalalabad, Saudi and Palestinian Wahabis funded by rich Arab princes run a mini-Wahabi kingdom loathed by most Afghans. However, the latter keep quiet as large payoffs are made. Meanwhile, hundreds of Pakistani Pashtuns, inspired by Maulana Maudoodi and belonging to the Jamaat-e-Islami, have eagerly joined Gulbadin Hekmatyar's forces in Logar province south of Kabul. Other Pashtuns now consider Hekmatyar as the standard-bearer of Pashtun nationalism.

From Central Asia to Indonesia, outsiders see the new Afghan civil war as a massive training ground for their own beliefs, to be put into practice elsewhere. Clearly, Afghanistan's future survival as a unified state depends as much on the willingness of outside powers to stop fueling their protégés inside the country, as it does on Afghans themselves ending their ethnic rivalries and reaching a reconciliation. Both hopes seem as far fetched as ever following another bout of violence which broke out in Kabul just hours after the mujahideen victory.

Having held their breath for two dramatic weeks that changed the course of Afghan history, Kabul's citizens barely had time to celebrate the mujahideen victory when they were forced to flee the city. Soon after the Kabul takeover, the Hezb-i-Islami rained down indiscriminate shelling and rockets on the city. Already deprived of water and electricity, and with no telephones or communication with the outside world, many Afghans considered it better to leave the city than stay and die. After 14 years of hoping for peace, nothing seemed to have changed.

The new bout of bloodletting stemmed from a single cause. No regional power or mujahideen party was willing to take the UN seriously, and constantly tried to undermine its authority. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spent three months double crossing the UN by talking of peace on the one hand, but planning war with Qazi Hussain Ahmad and Hekmatyar at the same time.

For their part, the Iranians and the Saudis did the same. While the mujahideen talked of lists of names for the proposed government, in reality they were planning for the final offensive on Kabul and the civil war they knew would follow.

Ironically, perhaps the only party that played fair and square with the UN was that of ex-President Najibullah. Today, he is stowed away in a safehouse in Kabul, a prisoner of his own concessions.

Last month, there were two coups planned for the capture of Kabul. One was successful and the other was not. The first creeping coup was planned by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Uzbek militia chief, General Rashid Dostum, and a large section of the Afghan army. The entire air force, meanwhile, was led by Kabul garrison commander, General Nabi Azimi.

The second coup was planned by Gulbadin Hekmatyar, Interior Minister Raz Mohammed Pakthi, Defence Minister Aslam Watanjar, and helped by a section of the army and the Sarandoy under General Manoki Mangal. This attempt failed because the Massoud coup had united, temporarily at least,

the majority of non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Further, the hatred of Hekmatyar by some Pashtun commanders had neutralised many Pashtun mujahideen. Hekmatyar's unwillingness to yield anything to anybody had cut him out of round one.

However, the very success of Massoud's coup has already outlined the parameters of an ethnic battleground that could make Lebanon look like child's play. The blood-red map of ethnic warfare between the Pashtuns and the rest is already being sketched out in the devastated Afghan countryside. Round two is now being fought and if there is a slight lull, it may perhaps be because both sides are temporarily exhausted and will only recuperate for bigger offensives in the future.

Clearly, Pakistan is much to blame for the present state of affairs. Nawaz Sharif's praise for General Zia's policies was both misguided and misleading. Zia's strategic legacy in backing the Afghan cause is, undoubtedly, real and worthy of praise. But his tactical legacy in dividing the Afghans – playing favourites with their leaders, ignoring the minorities in favour of the Pashtuns and allowing outsiders to come and play jihād on Pakistani soil – are some of the adverse aspects of Zia's legacy that the Afghans are having to deal with today. And Pakistanis may well suffer tomorrow if the ethnic war crosses the border, which it will.

Far from being a genius, General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, the man who refused to deal with Massoud and other leaders in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, evolved a policy for the ISI that was to prove ruinous. Pundits in the media argued this for years, but to no effect. Its consequences are self-evident today.

Of all the countries involved in the Afghan imbroglio in the past, it is ironic that the US and the former Soviet Union have got off extremely lightly by distancing themselves from the present drama in Kabul. They were the real protagonists in the Afghan war, who turned Afghanistan into a battleground for the global Cold War, with both sides determined to fight to the last Afghan.

For Pakistan's already troubled North West Frontier and Balochistan provinces, the worst is yet to come. Forget about the refugees, the crushing ecological and economic problems they bought with them. Forget about the drugs and guns mafia and the booming black economy it created. Now, for the Pakistani Pashtuns, what is at stake is much more alarming.

For 300 years, the Pashtuns on this side of the border have dictated their terms with the centre because of the clout they could muster from Kabul, which was ruled by Pashtuns. No Pakistani Pashtun leader can tolerate the idea of a Tajik or Uzbek ruling in Kabul, because it crushes his negotiating position from Peshawar. Most probably, we will now see Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Wali Khan, Mir Afzal and Gulbadin Hekmatyar make common cause for the reimposition of Pashtun hegemony in Kabul.

For Balochistan, this spells even worse trouble. The Baloch, already paranoid because of their minority status in their own province – and facing demands from Balochistan's Pashtuns for a separate province – will fight any attempt by the Afghan-Pakistani Pashtuns to re-establish their hegemony in Kabul. The Baloch will find common cause with the present government in Kabul, while the Pashtuns will unite against it. The ethnic war in Afghanistan will rapidly spill over to the Land of the Pure.

Afghanistan was once a paradise that time forgot. It is now the melting pot of the entire region as its internal conflicts send destructive vibrations through Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's victory prayers in Kabul were short sighted. Perhaps he should have been praying for peace instead. ■

From Ahmed Rashid in Kabul

## THE ETHNIC DIVIDE

The crisis in Afghanistan has been accentuated by the fact that the majority ethnic group – the Pashtuns – no longer control the levers of immediate power. For the first time in Afghan history, the two most powerful military leaders in the country are non-Pashtuns. The Tajik mujahideen leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud and the Uzbek militia leader, General Rashid Dostam, are both allies. Together, they now control the largest military and political forces in the country and have the support of what remains of the Afghan army.

In Jalalabad, the heartland of the Pashtuns, a huge council of guerrilla commanders sits in the Spinder Hotel outside town, deciding what to do. Armed men move in and out and gunfire still ripples across the city as local commanders, loyal to no mujahideen party, still battle for territory. Nobody is interested in going to Kabul to talk to the new government. "The Pashtuns are trapped between their unwillingness to support Hekmatar in his offensive and their unwillingness to ally themselves with a government that has no strong Pashtun presence," says an independent commander.

Moreover, it was highly significant that as Mojahiddi took over power from the former Kabul regime, none of the powerful Pashtun commanders was present on the dais. Even though Ahmad Shah Massoud claims to have the support of Jalaluddin Haqqani from the Gardez and Khost region, Abdul Haq from Jalalabad and the Kandahar Shura, no Pashtun commander has publicly endorsed or joined the new government.

This is exactly what Hekmatar is banking on in the future – to be able to draw on the well-springs of Pashtun nationalism and even chauvinism, to convince his fellow commanders that although many of them may hate him, he is the only man left in the field who is still standing up for Pashtun rights.

Even those from the former regime who are supporting the

new Islamic government are non-Pashtun. The Kabul garrison commander and the army's strongest who cooperated with Massoud to allow the takeover of Kabul is General Mohammad Nabi Azimi, a Tajik. Former Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil, who is trying to worm his way into a new job, is Persian-speaking. On the other hand, those who fought the new government from the Interior Ministry building before they were driven out by Massoud's men were die-hard Pashtuns. Men like Interior Minister Raz Mohammed Pakhtin, Defense Minister General Aslam Watanjar and Vice President General Rafi, all hail from Paktia – the heartland of Pashtun nationalism.

The key to the success of the new government is Massoud, who now dominates a region stretching from the Central Asian borders to Kabul province. As Janjat guerrillas moved towards Kabul last week, Massoud himself held court at Charkhar, 35 miles north of the city. Here, senior Afghan army and militia officers, other mujahideen commanders and government officials arrived to meet him.

For 14 years, Massoud has remained in the mountains of north-eastern Afghanistan, travelling to Pakistan for the first time only last year. Untainted by the corruption of the Peshawar-based leaders, he is lionised by his men and secretly adored by the women of Kabul.

However, Massoud is a Tajik – one of the original ethnic groups of Afghanistan, pushed out by the Pashtuns and subsequently treated like servants. The war with the Soviets gave every ethnic group a chance to prove itself – and under Massoud the Tajiks proved their military prowess dramatically.

Massoud has a well-disciplined force of some 10,000 guerrillas trained like a regular army, and tens of thousands of irregulars. Over the years, he has also initiated the most effective social, education and health programmes in liberated areas, and has thus been widely supported by western donor agencies.

Massoud is certainly willing

to befriend the Pashtuns because he knows that without a strong Pashtun presence in the next government Afghanistan could be plunged into ethnic civil war. Janjat leaders say that Massoud will support the candidature of Jalaluddin Haqqani to be the next President of Afghanistan.

But Massoud may also encounter a problem with his new-found ally, the Uzbek militia leader, General Abdul Rashid Dostam, who has his headquarters in the northern city of Mazair-e-Sherif and heads the Islamic Jihad Council (IJC). A burly, six-foot man who dresses in jungle camouflage, Dostam told reporters last week that he leads a force of 200,000 men and controls nine of the country's 29 provinces. The most crucial aspect of all is that Dostam now dominates Afghanistan's borders with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

For the past decade, Dostam's Jauzgan militia has backed the regime and has been used by the army as part of its frontline troops, defending Pashtun cities such as Jalalabad and Gardez when they came under mujahideen attack. The Jauzgan have a reputation for brutality and are loathed by the Pashtuns – be they supporters of the former regime or the mujahideen.

Dostam's other major ally is General Abdul Momin, the 37-year old Tajik who is the former commander of the city of Herat, which lies on the border with Uzbekistan. It was Momin's rebellion against the regime in January – because he was being replaced by a Pashtun officer – that set off the present chain of events.

Dostam and Momin's revolt last month, which was joined

by the Ismaili leader, General Syed Jafer Nadeiri, and their switching sides to link up with Massoud was a timely move. But it has left the Pashtun mujahideen stunned and very reluctant to give him a share of power.

"The reason we started this movement is that Najibullah sat on, humiliated and abused the rights of the minorities. The hard working people of Afghanistan have been side-stepped," Dostam said, clearly challenging the Pashtuns. Western governments and the media have tended to ignore Dostam in favour of Massoud, but it is clear that no future government can be formed without Dostam.

Such was Dostam's belief in his own strength that he did not bother to come to Kabul during last week's dramatic events, but instead sent a junior general with 620 Uzbek fighters who guarded the airport and were put in the frontline in Logar against Hekmatyar's forces. But clearly, Massoud's alliance with Dostam is tenuous and if Massoud is to win over the Pashtuns, their first demand will be that he rein in Dostam. A split between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks would only add to Afghanistan's myriad problems.

"Afghanistan is on the edge of a precipice. Either the minorities and the Pashtuns bridge the canyon, or we all fall into it together," said a close aide to former President Najibullah. The future looks bleak in Afghanistan, with ethnic conflicts being worked out not in the debating chamber but on the streets, through the barrel of a gun. ■

From Ahmed Rashid in Charkar and Jalalabad



# AFGHANISTAN FORUM

## CONTENTS



VOL. XX

July 1991

NO. 4

Chronology.....	2- 4
War Without End.....	5- 7
Articles from <u>The Herald</u> .....	8-14
Pan-Islamic Issues.....	15-17
Other clippings.....	17-25
The FORUM talks to Nancy Dupree.....	26-27
The FORUM listens to Sima Wali.....	27
Food.....	28
Recent Publications.....	29
Book Reviews.....	30-31
Items from <u>The Kabul Times</u> .....	32-36

AFGHANISTAN FORUM, INC.  
201 EAST 71ST STREET, 2K  
NEW YORK, NY 10021



#### ABBREVIATIONS USED

ACBAR	- Agency Coordinating Bureau for Afghan Relief
AIG	- Afghan Interim Government
BIA	- Bakhtar Information Agency
CC	- Central Committee
CSM	- Christian Science Monitor
DYOA	- Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	- German Democratic Republic
ICRC	- Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT	- Kabul Times
LAT	- Los Angeles Times
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- New York Times
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PCV	- Peace Corps Volunteer
PDPA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PT	- Pakistan Times
PVO	- Private Voluntary Organization
RC	- Revolutionary Council
RA	- Republic of Afghanistan
SCMP	- South China Morning Post
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNOCA	- United Nations Office of the Commissioner for Afghanistan
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WSJ	- Wall Street Journal
WP	- Washington Post

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the  
Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

Please send items for the AFGHANISTAN FORUM to  
The Afghanistan Forum, Inc.  
201 East 71st Street, 2K  
New York, NY 10021, USA

The opinions expressed in the FORUM are those of the  
parties & publications involved and are not necessarily  
those of the Afghanistan FORUM. Listing of organizations  
does not necessarily imply endorsement.

Mary Ann Siegfried  
Editor & typist

Leonard Oppenheim  
Treasurer &  
proofreader

Subscription rates: \$25 per year (US & Canada) (Add \$5 for FORUM PAPERS)  
6 issues/year \$25 per year (foreign); airmail Europe - \$35; Asia \$40.  
\$35 per year (institutions) \$45; \$50.  
(includes FORUM PAPERS)

ISSN 0889-2148